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1.

INTRODUCTION

"Selecting an electoral system is not a purely technical decision. It may
have huge consequences for the operation of the political system."' This
was certainly true during the 2000 election, when the popular vote supported
Al Gore for President, 2 but the Electoral College did not.3 Ultimately, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided the election and hailed George W. Bush as the
43rd President of the United States.4
Calls for electoral reform can be heard after controversial elections.'
Some call for an overhaul of the Electoral College,6 while others criticize
voting technology and the lack of a uniform ballot.7 Yet for better or for
worse, the Electoral College is not going anywhere. However, this does not
mean changes cannot be made. In fact, the opposite is true.

1. Andre Blais & Louis Massicotte, Electoral Systems, in COMPARING DEMOCRACIES 2: NEW
CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY OF ELECTIONS AND VOTING 40,40 (Lawrence LeDuc et al. eds., 2002).

2. Democratic candidate Al Gore received 50,999,897 votes (or 48.38%) while Republican
candidate George W. Bush received 50,456,002 votes (or 47.87%). Federal Election Commission,
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/
General
Election
Results,
2000
Official
Presidential
2000presgeresults.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2009) [hereinafter 2000 Results].
3. A candidate needs 270 electoral votes to win the Presidency. 2000 Results, supranote 2. Al
Gore received 266 electoral votes and George W. Bush received 271. Id. Before Florida was
decided, neither candidate had enough votes to win. ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000
ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 2-3 (2001). George

W. Bush ultimately received Florida's electoral votes with a lead of 537 popular votes over Al Gore.
Id. at 3. Besides the 2000 election, three other times in America's electoral history-1 824, 1876,
and 1888-the popular vote winner lost to the Electoral College winner. NEAL R. PEIRCE &
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 5 (1981).

4. GREENE, supranote 3, at 111.
5. Donald Lutz et al., The Electoral College in Historical and PhilosophicalPerspective, in
CHOOSING A PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND BEYOND 31, 41 (Paul D. Schumaker &

Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2002); Jacob Tanger, Election of President, in DIRECT ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT 7, 7 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1949) (compiling many essays discussing the potential pitfalls
and possibilities of reforming the Electoral College); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election
Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425, 425 (2006) (noting
increased interest in election administration after the 2000 and 2004 elections).
6. Paul Schumaker, Analyzing the Electoral College and Its Alternatives, in CHOOSING A
PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND BEYOND, supra note 5, at 10, 15.

Despite calls to

abolish the Electoral College, this institution has "emerged as a natural extension of the principles of
federalism, separation of powers, and a deliberative process that informed the design of all the
institutions of the U.S. Constitution." Lutz et al., supranote 5, at 45.
7. Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over PresidentialElections:
Lessons from the Pastand Reforms for the Future,43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851, 872-73 (2002).
8. The Electoral College was established by the Constitution "as a compromise between two
alternative methods for selecting the president." Schumaker, supra note 6, at 13. The only way to
change Article II, Section I is through a constitutional amendment. Richard L. Hasen, When
"Legislature" May Mean More than 'Legislature": Initiated Electoral College Reform and the

1114

[Vol. 37: 1113, 2010]

Importing Democracy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

America's system is extremely decentralized and highly partisan,
leaving much room for improvement. 9
The political landscape is
undoubtedly molded by the electoral system in place. America's system
allows for "Loser Presidents"10 and "hanging" chads." This Comment seeks
to address pitfalls like these by presenting changes-fully in line with the
constitutional mandate in Article II, Section 112-- to the current electoral
system in an effort to positively shape our democratic landscape.
Part II explores the history of Article II, Section 1, beginning with the
Constitutional Convention and the Framers' debates over what type of
electoral system would best serve America, and ends with a discussion of the
1800 and 1876 elections and the changes to the system that arose from these
controversial elections. 3 Part III dissects the various Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Framers' intent when they created Article II,
Section 1.14 Part IV provides an overview of recent events, including the
2000, 2004, and 2008 elections," specifically analyzing the Help America
Vote Act (HAVA) and how this new piece of legislation fits into the overall
history of Article II, Section 1.16 Part V looks to international law as a
possible answer to some of America's election problems 7 by focusing on
Germany, India, and Australia and how the electoral systems of these
nations have shaped the way reformers approach the task of redefining the
manner in which a country elects its officials.' 8 Part VI brings together the
history of the Electoral College and the innovations from Germany, India,
Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 603 (2008). This tends to be an unrealistic
reform because amendments require an approval of two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the
state legislatures, making them difficult to pass. Id. Small states would be reluctant to vote for an
amendment that changes the Electoral College because it "confer[s] a special advantage on citizens
of small states by allocating two electors to each state regardless of their population." Schumaker,
supra note 6, at 26.
9. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
11. "A chad is 'hanging' if it hangs onto the ballot by one of its corners and is detached at three
corners." GREENE, supra note 3, at 32. The "hanging" chad made a grand appearance during the
2000 election. Id. "Swinging," "tri-chad" and "dimpled" chads were other anomalies Florida dealt
with when deciding the fate of the Presidency. Id.
12. "Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of
electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
13. See infra notes 21-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 86-128 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 129-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 179-239 and accompanying text.
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and Australia, and proposes three solutions for America's system-creating
a non-partisan electoral commission, incorporating a mixed electoral system
into the current system, and ensuring national standards for election
administration.' 9 Finally, Part VII concludes this Comment.
II.

REMEMBERING OUR ROOTS: EXPLORING THE HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS
OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 1

A.

The ConstitutionalConvention

The main issue addressed at the Constitutional Convention20 was how to
balance the competing interests of the small states and the large states.2 In
fact, the tension surrounding this issue almost destroyed the Framers'
goals. 22 However, through the "Great Compromise," 23 "small states
preserved their role as sovereigns through equal representation in the Senate,
while the proportional representation in the House gave leverage to the
larger states." 24 The Compromise mainly addressed how the states would be
represented in Congress; however, the same struggle colored the debates
about who should elect the Executive. 25 Three viable options were presented

19. See infra notes 240-316 and accompanying text.
20. The Constitutional Convention, or also known as the Philadelphia Convention, occurred from
May 25 through September 17, 1787. TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH
AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 7 (1994). Fifty-

five delegates from twelve states were in attendance, all of whom were white men and most of them
lawyers. Id. These delegates "represented a political elite with years of experience in the affairs of
their states and nation. . . . They were knowledgeable, astute, pragmatic, and bold individuals . . .
Id.
21. Matthew J. Festa, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting in the Electoral
College, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2108 (2001) (noting that "historians recognize that the agreement
did indeed address the central issue of the convention, that of balancing the competing interests of
different states through compromise over representation in the national government").
22. Id. at 2108 n.55 (noting the "Great Compromise" was the turning point of the Convention
and before the Compromise was reached, "the issue of representation in Congress posed such a
threat to an auspicious outcome that Washington wrote Hamilton that the crisis was alarming, and he
'almost despaired.' '[W]ithout the Great Compromise . . . it is hard to see how the Federal
Convention could have proceeded further."' (quoting CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT
PHILADELPHIA 185 (1966)) (citation omitted)).
23. Also known as the Connecticut Compromise. Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 33.
24. Festa,supranote 21, at 2108.
25. See William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIs. 145,
151 (1996) (noting the debates concerning election of the President and Vice President reflected the
large state versus small state struggle that formed the structure of Congress).
[T]he electoral college was established as a device to boost the power of southern states
in the election of president. The same 'compromise' that gave southern states more
House members by counting slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of
apportioning representation ... gave those states electoral college votes in proportion to
their Congressional delegation.
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at the Convention: appointment by Congress, popular election, and an
intermediate system using state officials and electors.26
On May 29, 1787, just days before the Great Compromise, James
Madison of Virginia delivered the first proposal, the "Virginia Plan," which
advocated that the "National Legislature" choose the "National Executive." 27
The plan favored large states by allocating power proportionately according
to a state's size.28 Small states, not keen on the idea of the large states
holding all the power, responded with their own plan, the "New Jersey
Plan." 29 Like the Virginia Plan, the Legislature would elect the Executive;
however, in this plan power would be distributed equally amongst state
representatives in both the House and the Senate. 30 These two plans set the
tenor of the ensuing debates with all subsequent discussions assuming the
Legislature would choose the Executive.31
Despite this early thought, some delegates expressed reservations about
the idea of an executive tied to the legislature.32 James Wilson of
Pennsylvania proposed a plan whereby the people33 would choose
"Electors" 34 who would elect the "Executive magistracy,"35 otherwise the

Lani Guinier, And to the C Students: The Lessons of Bush v. Gore, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION:
DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 231, 236 (Ronald

Dworkin ed., 2002).
26. Martin J. Siegel, CongressionalPower over PresidentialElections: The Constitutionality of
the Help America Vote Act Under Article II, Section 1, 28 VT. L. REV. 373, 378 (2003); Schumaker,
supra note 6, at 13; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 19.
27. Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 31. The Virginia Plan stated:
Resolved that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature
for the term of [unspecified] years, to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed
compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made
so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be
eligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to execute the National laws,
it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 31 (1987).

28. Festa,supranote 21, at 2109.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id. "At this point the convention appeared to be in real deadlock as the large states insisted
on population-based apportionment and the small states held firm for equal representation." PEIRCE
& LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 15. The delegates conducted a vote on June 19, and seven states
favored the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey Plan as a blueprint for the new government. Id.
32. GREENE, supra note 3, at 18.
33. "People" meant adult white males and excluded women and blacks. KURODA, supranote 20,
at 9.
34. Some delegates felt that if the electors had to all gather in one place, the inconvenience and
expense of doing so would mean some electors would not attend and this would lead to a loss of
influence in elections. Id. at I1. Others felt electors would be partial to local candidates forcing
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Executive "would be too dependent [on Congress] to stand the mediator
between the intrigues [and] sinister views of the Representatives and the
general liberties [and] interests of the people."3 Pierce Butler of South
Carolina agreed with Wilson, stating, "The two great evils to be avoided are
cabal at home, [and] influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid
either if the Election be made by the Nat[iona]l Legislature."n Wilson's
plan provided a point of departure from the Virginia and New Jersey plans,
but was ultimately rejected.
Like election by Congress, popular election also met fierce opposition.39
States' rights advocates feared a popular election "would incite and
empower partisan groups and political factions, leaving no role for state
governments."'t 0 Roger Sherman opposed popular elections because the
people could "never be sufficiently informed of [the candidates'] characters,
and besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will
"[t]he whole body of electors . . . to sit a long time and ballot more than once in order to determine
the victor. Such a process would invite deals among electors and subject them to temptations and
influence." Id.
35. Festa, supra note 21, at 2110. Wilson's plan proposed dividing states into districts and each
district would elect one elector. Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 32. This "proposal bypassed state
governments and retained a unitary system." Id.
36. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 30 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter Farrand, CONVENTION RECORDS], available at http://files.libertyfund.org/
files/1786/0544-02 Bk.pdf. Hugh Williamson, from North Carolina, felt critics would think this
plan "too elaborate, expensive, and redundant, and that they placed an unnecessary additional barrier
between the people and their rulers." KURODA, supra note 20, at 10.
37. Farrand, CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 36, at 112. The delegates' concern was that an
executive elected by the Legislature would become dependent on them, unable to take any initiative
apart from the Legislature, and would want to please the members of Congress to gain re-election.
KURODA, supra note 20, at 8. To overcome these concerns, the delegates thought about making the
Presidency seven years with no possibility of re-election. Id. The delegates expressed concerns over
this plan, thinking that if the Legislature impeached the Executive then he would not have the
opportunity to serve his full seven years. Id. Additionally, if the Executive was denied re-election
then the country could possibly run out of competent candidates. Id. "Finally, a Congress,
composed of persons known to powerful interests and foreign nations and gathered conveniently at
the nation's capital, could be corrupted by promises of favor from foreign countries and political
parties, and engage in horse-trading votes for President." Id at 9.
38. Festa, supra note 21, at 2111. The delegates voted on the direct vote proposal twice--once
on July 17 and then again on August 24. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 22. The first vote
rejected the proposal by a one-to-nine vote (James Wilson's Pennsylvania being the only "for" vote)
and the second vote rejected the proposal by a two-to-nine vote (this time Delaware and
Pennsylvania the only supporters). Id.
39. Small states and southern states formed a loose coalition in support of the legislative mode.
KURODA, supra note 20, at 9. Small states felt that direct election "would give an insuperable
advantage to large states like Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, which would likely provide
most of the successful presidential candidates." Id. Southern states were opposed to direct election
because of the slaves in their states who were disenfranchised. Id.
40. Siegel, supra note 26, at 381. The states' rights delegates felt that direct election would erase
the geographical and physical boundaries between the states and would "'supersede altogether the
state authorities."' KURODA, supra note 20, at 9 (citing Farrand, CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
36, at 80).

1118

[Vol. 37: 1113, 2010]

ImportingDemocracy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

generally vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State will
have the best chance for the appointment."4 1
A third view emerged that suggested using electors and state
governors.42 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts proposed a plan in which
state legislatures would select the presidential candidates and then electors,
chosen by state governors, would make the final choice.4 3 Madison
supported the use of electors, but unlike Gerry, he favored a smaller role for
the states." Butler sided more with Gerry than Madison, noting, "[T]he
[Government] should not be made so complex [and] unwieldy as to disgust
the States. This would be the case, if the election sh[oul]d be referred to the
people."' Butler preferred the use of electors who were chosen by the
states' legislatures.46
The delegates quickly came to the conclusion that this decision could
not be made until they decided how the legislature would be elected.47 The
Great Compromise provided much needed structure for the executive debate
because it incorporated both the Virginia Plan-proportionate representation
in the House, and the New Jersey Plan-equal representation in the Senate. 4 8
41. Farrand, CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 36, at 29. The only two men at the time who
had national reputations were George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. KURODA, supranote 20,
at 9. Opponents of direct election saw more problems with this system: "(1) [A] census as a prelude
to the first election could not be taken, (2) states had varying suffrage requirements, (3) registration
and supervision of a national election would be expensive and time-consuming, and (4) a national
election might produce disturbances, even riots, which would destabilize the republican experiment."
Id.
42. Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 32. This third view was the most plausible of dozens of others
that were mentioned. For example, one delegate proposed a plan whereby three executives would be
elected-one executive for the northern states, one for the middle states, and one for the southern
states. KURODA, supra note 20, at 10. The delegates were fortunate to have these debates "without
daily public reports of their speeches. They were able to express their views freely, listen to each
other's arguments, and to change their minds without fear of immediate public scrutiny of their work
and without having to answer charges of vacillating on issues." Id.
43. Siegel, supra note 26, at 382.
44. Id. at 382-83. When the convention began, few delegates supported the intermediate view as
their first choice; however, many liked the idea as a strong second choice. PEIRCE & LONGLEY,
supra note 3, at 22.
45. Farrand, CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 36, at 112.
46. Id
47. Festa, supra note 21, at 2111 ("The composition of the Congress would be outcomedeterminative for the executive, as far as the relative power of the states was concerned, because the
framers contemplated that the legislature would have some role in executive selection."). "Members
of the convention did not invest much time and energy in the debate over executive selection,
primarily because other matters were seen as more important, but also because they were in
uncharted waters greatly complicated by crosscurrents of other issues." Lutz et al., supra note 5, at
33.
48. Festa, supra note 21, at 2111. Choosing an Executive was a particularly difficult proposition
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On July 17, the delegates returned to the discussion about how the
Executive should be elected with appointment by Congress remaining the
"point of reference."49 However, throughout the debates, delegates were
mainly concerned with the lack of independence if the legislature chose, and
the dominance of the "populous states" if the people chose.o Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut introduced the first serious compromise between
these competing interests. In his proposal, state legislatures appointed the
electors who would choose the Executive, with the largest states receiving
three electors and the smallest states receiving one.52 The proposal was
eventually set aside because some of the delegates were troubled by the
"extreme inconveniency [and] the considerable expense, of drawing together
men from all the States for the single purpose of electing the Chief
Magistrate.""
Madison stepped into the fray on July 25 and addressed the other
delegates: "There are objections ag[ain]st every mode that has been, or
perhaps can be proposed.... The option before us then lay between an
appointment by electors chosen by the people-and an immediate
appointment by the people."54 Though many proposals failed, they show
"the Convention was primarily focused on the question of how to make the
selection palatable to the spectrum of state interests by preserving a state
role in the process."
Finally, the delegates referred the matter to the
Committee of Eleven.
for the framers because many of them had fought in the revolutionary war to overthrow a King and
establish a republican government. KURODA, supra note 20, at 8. "[T]hey feared that executive
authority harbored monarchical tendencies and did not want a new King George, even if a Virginian
and not a Hanoverian." Id.
49. Festa,supranote 21, at 2111.
50. Id. at 2113. The framers were also concerned that "candidates selected through direct
election would not be 'worthy' because the people at large had no simple way to identify such
candidates." Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 33.
51. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supranote 3, at 22-23.
52. Festa, supra note 21, at 2113.
53. Farrand, CONVENTION RECORDS, supranote 36, at 95.
54. Id. at 109-10.
55. Festa, supra note 21, at 2114. Kuroda explains a vote taken on August 24:
[The vote] showed clearly the division between large and small states. On this occasion,
John Rutledge of South Carolina proposed a joint, rather than concurrent, ballot of the
two houses of the legislature as an amendment to the legislative mode, seven-year term,
and ineligibility. . . . Rutledge's motion gave advantage to the more populous states over
the lesser ones.
KURODA, supra note 20, at 13-14. Seven states (Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North and
South Carolina, New Hampshire and Delaware) voted for the motion and four (Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maryland, and Georgia) voted against. Id. at 14. "After these votes on August 24, the large
states and their allies had little reason to support any mode which gave more weight to the smaller
ones in the selection of the President." Id.
56. Festa, supra note 21, at 2115. The Committee was composed of one delegate from each
state. Id.
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The Committee returned on September 4 and presented the delegates
with a plan." The plan18 "created the office of presidential elector and
assigned to states a number of electors equal to the total number of
Representatives and Senators each had in Congress. Presidents were to
serve for four years and be eligible for re-election." 9 The plan provided a
working compromise between the various proposals previously debated.60
Though attempts were made to alter the proposal, only slight changes were
made and the Committee's plan was included in the Constitution.6 1
Throughout the Convention, the central issue focused on the states' role
in electing the Executive and never on the manner in which the Executive
would be chosen.62 Once the decision was made as to how many electoral
57. KURODA, supra note 20, at 14.
58. The Committee's plan became Article II, Section I of the Constitution: "Each state shall
appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the
whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The Constitution further outlines Congress's role in
presidential elections. First, "Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day
on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States." Id
Second, "[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted." Id
59. KURODA, supra note 20, at 14. Ultimately, "[t]he final provisions drew upon many different
ideas, and almost every aspect can be traced to earlier arguments and counterarguments presented
over a period of several months-some theoretical, political, personal, and mundane." Id. at 25.
60. Schumaker, supra note 6, at 13-14 ("The Founders anticipated that the Electoral College
would work as follows. Unlike Congress, the College would be an ad hoc and dispersed body,
constituted by different members every four years. It would never convene collectively. Rather,
state delegations would meet within their states, deliberate among themselves, and vote as individual
electors.... [T]he founders assumed that the electors would exercise independent judgments about
who, among notable figures, was most qualified to serve as president.").
61. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 25. The main change made to the proposal dealt with
whether the House or Senate should decide a tie between the electors. Id. The delegates proposed
"the contingent election be decided in the House but that each state have but a single vote." Id. at
26. The compromise proposal was put to a vote and passed ten-to-one. Id. During the ratification
debates, some states like Pennsylvania and New York barely discussed Article II, Section I, while in
other states, like Virginia and New York, the issue was hotly contested. KURODA, supra note 20, at
17. In these latter states an amendment was proposed to alter the four-year term and re-election
clauses in the Constitution. Id.
62. Festa, supra note 21, at 2117 ("Interestingly, no mention was made at Philadelphia of the fact
that the plan left the method of choosing electors entirely to the discretion of the states-in fact, it
clearly committed the decision to the state legislatures."). For the first four elections, the majority of
the states chose to have their legislatures choose the electors rather than the people. PEIRCE &
LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 45. The choice between state legislature and direct election was so fluid
that if the legislature felt their candidate would be defeated by the popular vote, then the legislature
would pass laws to revoke direct election and put the choice back in the legislators' hands. Id.
Eventually all but two states turned toward a popular vote system under a general ticket. Id. at 47.
"The adoption of the general ticket in some states, moreover, virtually compelled the others to
follow suit so that their strength in the electoral college would not be diluted." Id

1121

votes each state would receive, "the lesser issue of choosing a method was
left to the discretion of the states. The plan implicitly recognized that the
states would be exercising a degree of sovereignty by choosing their electors
as they saw fit."63
"In its creation of the Electoral College, the Convention produced a
compromise that was essentially a pragmatic response to competing
interests, but one that was nonetheless a manifestation of the larger conflict
between national power and state sovereignty that the convention was called
to address."64
B. Putting the System to the Test: The Elections of 1800 and 1876
The election of 18006' between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr
resulted in a deadlock because all the members of the Republican Party
voted for the two men intending Jefferson to be President and Burr Vice
President.66 At the time, the Constitution provided that if the state electors
failed to elect the President by a majority vote, then the House of
Representatives would elect the President from the candidates who received

63. Festa, supranote 21, at 2117.
64. Id at 2119. The framers had three federalist goals when they designed the electoral system.
First, they were concerned about distributing power equally between the large and small states.
Second, they wanted to make sure power was distributed equally between the state governments and
the national government. Third, they wanted to ensure presidential legitimacy was based on
federalist-rather than populist-principles. See Donald Haider-Markel et al., The Role of
Federalism in PresidentialElections, in CHOOSING A PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND

BEYOND, supra note 5, at 53, 54. Overall, the Electoral College was less about distrust of the people
and more about assuring federalist ideals, for it's not about who gets the most votes but how the
votes are distributed. Id at 56. Using federalist principles, the President would be the candidate
with "the most widespread support across all the states in the nation." Id. One could argue these
ideals underlying the original design of the Electoral College are no longer in play today. Id. at 57.
For instance, two parties (Republicans and Democrats) now dominate the system and these parties
have electors who pledge to vote for one party or the other (rather than individual candidates). Id.
The original compromise was meant to place large states and small states on an equal playing field.
See supra notes 28-29. However, today large states tend to dominate "because voters in competitive
states have greater odds of altering the way that their state's electoral votes are cast and because
large states are more likely to cast a bloc of electoral votes that are decisive to the outcome."
Haider-Markel et al., supra, at 57.
65. Prior to the election, the Electoral College was witnessing change. KURODA, supra note 20,
at 73. First, several states were revising how electors were chosen to guarantee one party or the
other would have an advantage. Id. "Second, the course of the campaign made the constitutional
provision for presidential electors a major issue. Third, in the . . . Senate, Federalists initiated a
measure to allow the Congress to review the returns from electors and to accept or reject those
votes." Id. In this election, most states had their legislators appoint electors while five states had a
popular vote to determine electors. Id. at 83.
66. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 855. Before this election, the party system had been
mostly the elite competing for top positions, whereas in 1800 the system moved toward mass
participation. Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 37.
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the most electoral votes.67 Thus, the decision rested with the House, filled
with Federalists who had recently lost the election and "saw an opportunity
In
to frustrate their opponents by electing Burr . .. over Jefferson."
response to the electoral chaos, Congress passed the Twelfth Amendment,
"specifying that electors must separately designate their votes for President

67. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
In the framers' original formulation, the U.S. Senate opens and counts the ballots, and the
person with the greatest number of votes becomes president, as long as that person wins a
majority of the electors. If there is a tie, or if no one has a majority, the House of
Representatives' makes the selection. In the case of an even split of electoral votes,
House balloting is limited to the two candidates. If no one has a majority, the House
selects from among the five with the highest vote totals. After choosing the president, the
remaining person with the most electoral votes becomes vice president. If there is a tie,
or if no candidate has a majority, the U.S. Senate selects between the two. When the
House votes, each state has one vote to cast, which it casts in accord with the majority of
its House delegation. The president must have the votes of a majority of the states.
Lutz et al., supranote 5, at 34.
68. Each state received only one vote that could be lost if the state's representatives were equally
divided between the candidates. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 39.
69. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 855.
Some Federalists preferred Burr to Jefferson; others thought a deadlock might induce
Jefferson to make policy concessions in exchange for the presidency; still others were
willing to engage in the high-risk route of adjourning without electing anyone in hopes
that in the interregnum a Federalist could be installed in the office.
Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 37. Federalist James Bayard from Delaware broke the deadlock by
informing the other Federalists he would be voting for Jefferson rather than Burr. KURODA, supra
note 20, at 105. Bayard supported Jefferson because the alternative was destroying the Constitution.
Id. Though he was met with harsh criticisms from the other Federalists, most of the other
congressmen agreed to vote for Jefferson. Id Finally, with the thirty-sixth vote occurring on
February 17, Federalists from several states cast blank ballots so that their colleagues could cast a
ballot for Jefferson. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 40-41. For instance, Federalist Lewis
Morris from Vermont cast a blank ballot so that Matthew Lyon-the second of two Vermont
delegates-could cast a vote for Jefferson. Id. Had Morris cast his ballot for Burr, then the votes
from Vermont would have been lost. See supra note 68. Thus, Jefferson received votes from ten
states and Burr four states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island).
PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 40-41. Ultimately, the House voted for Jefferson to become
the President "without the vote of a single Federalist." KURODA, supra note 20, at 105.
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and for Vice President."70
The Twelfth Amendment is the only
constitutional change to the electoral process ever to have passed.'
Major electoral problems resurfaced again in the 1876 election between
Democratic candidate Samuel J. Tilden and Republican candidate
Rutherford B. Hayes. 72 Tilden received fifty-one percent of the popular vote
to Hayes' forty-eight percent.
Despite Tilden's clear lead over Hayes,
Republican leaders refused to accept his victory. 74 Instead, Republicancontrolled election boards in three former Confederate states-Florida,
Louisiana, and South Carolina-used their "power to disqualify votes
tainted by fraud or intimidation . .. [to throw] out enough democratic votes
to allow Republican electors to win in all three states."s Congress
70. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 855. See also KURODA, supra note 20 (offering a
comprehensive analysis of the road that led to the Twelfth Amendment and its subsequent
ratification). "The Twelfth Amendment shows the adaptability of the Electoral College to changing
political circumstances. The amendment accommodated party competition by ensuring the election
of a president and vice president from the same party, and it ended the complex plotting by electors
on how to cast their two votes." Lutz et al., supra note 5, at 37-38. The amendment created an
environment in which political parties could flourish and these parties led to the eventual situation
present today in which every state employs popular election of the electors-a situation not
mandated by the Constitution. Id at 38.
71. Lutz et al., supranote 5, at 35-36. The Twelfth Amendment effected the following changes:
1.The presidential electors must vote separately for president and vice president, instead
of casting two undifferentiated votes.
2. If an election is thrown into the House of Representatives because no candidate has a
majority, the House shall pick from the three top electoral vote recipients, rather than the
five stipulated in the original Constitution.
3. If the House is called on to pick the president and does not make a selection by March
4 ... then the new vice president will become president....
4. A majority of electoral votes is also required for the election of the vice president ....
5. The age, citizenship, and residence requirements for a vice president are to be the same
as those for a president ....
PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 44.

72. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 860-63. See Josephson & Ross, supra note 25, at 18485, for a detailed account of the problems experienced in this election.
73. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 863. The early returns on election night showed that
once-Republican strongholds-Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Indiana-were all going
for Tilden. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 52-53. Coupled with the expectation that southern
democratic states would also go Tilden's way, "Hayes admitted his defeat in his diary." Id.
74. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 53. Republicans were renewed when they realized
Hayes could win by one electoral vote if South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana all went his way.
Id
In each of the disputed southern states, Reconstruction was still in force, and the
Republicans controlled the state governments and election machinery. Republicans
counted on masses of Negro votes to win, while the Democrats employed threats and
intimidation and even violence on occasion to prevent the Negroes from casting ballots."
Id
75. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 863. South Carolina certified a slate of Hayes electors
because the army personnel stationed at various polls throughout the state prevented a fair election
thereby showing a slight lead for Hayes. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 53. However, on the
same day Democratic elector candidates met and sent their ballots for Tilden to Congress. Id. In
Florida, both the Republicans and the Democrats accused the other of fraud. Id. The canvassing
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eventually accepted these Republican electors and Hayes was elected
President.
As a result of the election,n Congress "tried to lay out rules that would
guide and constrain its future role in counting electoral votes."" Ten years
later Congress came to a consensus and passed the Electoral Counting Act of
1887.79 The legislation addressed two main issues: when electors were
considered certified and which slate-if more than one was certifiedshould be counted.80 The Act leaves much to the states, but limits their

board and governor certified a slate of Hayes electors but the Democrats won a challenge in court
and were able to submit electors for Tilden. Id. at 53-54. Louisiana was a complete mess as there
were two sets of everything: governors, canvassing boards, election returns showing different
results, and electoral colleges. Id. at 54.
76. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 54. At the time, Democrats controlled the House and
Republicans controlled the Senate. Id. No clear precedent existed as to how electoral disputes
should be resolved because the law that would have disqualified returns from states where one house
of Congress objected, had lapsed. Id. Congress needed to act immediately so they formed a joint
committee to create a law on resolving electoral disputes. Id. The committee drafted the Electoral
Commission Law-to be used only for this specific election, which passed both the House and the
Senate. Id.
77. The election
demonstrated a grave defect in the Constitution: its failure to spell out exact
responsibility for counting the electoral votes and resolving disputes, so that the
resolution of the entire presidential election can swing on the intrigues and maneuvers in
a partisanly motivated Congress, to the detriment of the people and presidency alike.
Id. at 56-57.
78. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 865.
79. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15 (2006). The Act "was narrowly crafted to address the specific problem of
post-election rule changes that had triggered the Hayes-Tilden debacle." Coenen & Larson, supra
note 7, at 866. This legislation is oddly reminiscent of the band-aid Congress created in 2002-the
Help America Vote Act. See infra notes 139-55 and accompanying text. Congress found the power
to enact this legislation based on their enumerated Article I power to count electoral votes. Id
Furthermore, Congress relied on their constitutional power "'[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper' to carry out its enumerated powers." Coenen & Larson, supra note 7 at 867;
id. at 868 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8). Coenen contextualized this reasoning into a present day
argument for a national ballot and equipment laws:
First, Congress may pass laws that are "necessary and proper," that is "convenient" or
"useful," for carrying into execution the counting power. Second, mandated state use of
a national ballot and of high-quality equipment is conducive to a proper count because it
eliminates difficulties in counting that might otherwise arise.
Id. at 909 (footnotes omitted).
80. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15.
First . . . Congress binds itself to accept electoral votes from States that resolve any
internal disputes before [the] six-day window closes. Second ... [i]f only one return has
been submitted from a state, then that is accepted unless both Houses of Congress, acting
separately, agree that it should be rejected because the votes were not "regularly given."
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WH-EN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 26 (2001).
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discretion "as to important matters of timing . .. [and] asserts final
congressional authority in counting electoral votes."8
The events following the 1876 election, like events following the 2000
election,82 allowed Congress to assert a greater role in presidential
elections.83 "Congress claimed a decisive role in the electoral-vote process
and created a precedent for an even larger role should the need arise. Most
critically, it would be a congressional statute, not only the Constitution, that
set the precise parameters for state and federal control of the electoral-vote
process."84 Put another way, Congress had effectively wedged its foot in the
states' electoral door.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION
CREATION OF PRECEDENT

1 AND

THE

Several prominent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the extent
of Congress's power over presidential elections. In Ex parte Yarbrough,"
defendants committed acts of violence against an African-American man in
an attempt to keep him from voting in a congressional election.
Defendants argued they should be discharged from prison because Congress
had no constitutional authority to pass the laws 9 under which defendants
81. Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 867. "[T]he Act, to the extent it concerned the states at
all, dealt primarily with the subject of timing; it addressed when selection rules were to be in place,
when electors were to be identified, and when electoral votes were to be submitted." Id
82. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
83. Coenen & Larson, supranote 7, at 867.
84. Id. The Counting Act gave Congress
the power to regulate all other aspects of a presidential election ... .Congress set the date
for presidential elections . . . . Congress guarantees that each state's electors shall serve if
those electors are chosen . . . at least six days prior to [the] meeting of the electors ....

Congress further controls the federal election process by mandating when the electoral
college shall meet ....
Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal Remedies for Election Fraud, Learning from
Florida'sPresidentialElection Debacle,63 U. PITr. L. REV. 159, 162-63 (2001) (quoting 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 (2000)).
85. "Congress asserted its power to act in 1887, and that assertion of power has never been
successfully challenged." Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 871.
86. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Burroughs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Ex parte Yarbrough,
10 U.S. 651 (1884).
87. 110 U.S. at 651. See Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential
Elections, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1968) (emphasizing the role Congress had played in presidential
elections).
88. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 656. Berry Saunders, an African-American man, was "beat[en],
bruis[ed], wound[ed], and otherwise maltreat[ed]" in an attempt to intimidate him as he exercised his
right to vote for a member of Congress. Id.
89. The laws fined and imprisoned anyone who "conspire[d] to prevent, by force, intimidation,
or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy, in a legal
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were being held.90 The Court held Congress did have the power to intervene
in federal elections, reasoning
[t]hat a government ... [who] has no power by appropriate laws
to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption,
and of fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and
demand the gravest consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is
superior to the general government, it must have the power to
protect the elections on which its existence depends, from violence
and corruption.91

The court rejected defendants' argument that Congress had no power
over federal elections because the Constitution failed to enumerate such
authority.92 Instead, the Court relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause:
This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United
States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by
reason of the inherent ability to put into words all derivative
powers-a difficulty which the instrument itself recognizes by
conferring on Congress the authority to pass all laws necessary and
proper to carry into execution the powers expressly granted, and all
other powers vested in the government or any branch of it by the
Constitution. 93
The expansive powers given to Congress in Ex parte Yarbrough were
quickly curtailed in subsequent cases. In McPhersonv. Blacker,94 nominees
for presidential electors brought suit against Michigan's Secretary of State,
challenging Michigan's passage of an act to nominate presidential electors
by congressional districts. 95 The act repealed the previous method usedstatewide voting.96 The plaintiffs' argued the state had no authority to

manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President
or Vice President .
Id. at 655.
90. Id. at 654.
91. Id. at 657-58 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 658; Siegel, supra note 26, at 405.
93. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
94. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id.

1127

appoint electors by district because "the appointment of electors by districts
is not an appointment by the state, [and] all its citizens otherwise qualified
The Court
are not permitted to vote for all the presidential electors."
disagreed with this argument, holding "the appointment and mode of
appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States under the
Constitution of the United States."98
The Court further highlighted Congress's specific powers over
presidential elections, noting Congress could determine the time of choosing
the electors and the day they give their votes. 99 However, as the Court
explained, "[T]he power and jurisdiction of the State is exclusive with the
exception of the provisions as to the number of electors and the ineligibility
of certain persons, so framed that Congressional and Federal influences
might be excluded." 00 Though decided only eight years apart, the Court in
Yarbrough accepted the notion that congressional powers could be
implied,o' whereas the Court in McPhersonridiculed judicial activism and
the doctrine that because the Constitution has been found in the
march of time sufficiently comprehensive to be applicable to
conditions not within the minds of its framers, and not arising in
their time, it may, therefore, be wrenched from the subjects
expressly embraced within it, and amended by judicial decision.1 02

97. Id. at 24-25.
98. Id. at 25, 35 (reasoning that if the Legislature itself can directly appoint electors then "it is
difficult to perceive why, if the legislature prescribes as a method of appointment choice by vote, it
must necessarily be by general ticket and not by districts"). The reasoning in McPherson relied
heavily on In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1890), a case that strongly reiterated the extent of
Congress's power:
The only rights and duties, expressly vested by the Constitution in the national
government, with regard to the appointment or the votes of presidential electors, are by
those provisions which authorize Congress to determine the time of choosing the electors,
and the day on which they shall give their votes, and which direct that the certificates of
their votes shall be opened by the President of the Senate in the presence of the two
houses of Congress, and the votes shall then be counted.
Id. at 379. Congress has never undertaken to interfere with the manner of appointing electors, or,
where (according to the now general usage) the mode of appointment prescribed by the law of the
state is election by the people, to regulate the conduct of such election, or to punish any fraud in
voting for electors; but has left these matters to the control of the states.
99. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
102. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 36. Ironically, the concurrence in Bush v. Gore "amended" Article
II, Section I relying mainly on McPherson for support, interpreting this case as meaning that the
state legislature has the last word regarding election administration. See infra note 127 and
accompanying text; Robert A. Schapiro, Article II as Interpretive Theory: Bush v. Gore and the
Retreatfrom Erie, 34 LoY. U. CHL L.J. 89, 97 (2002). Even Judge Posner-the concurrence's chief
supporter-"has candidly acknowledged the tepid support for this theory in text and precedent: 'The
interpretation that I am suggesting is not compelled by case law, legislative history, or constitutional
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The Court had to wait until 1934 to address this issue again. Though
Burroughs v. United States dealt with campaign finance laws and not the
extent of congressional power over presidential elections, the Court noted in
its opinion that "[n]either in purpose nor in effect does [the congressional act
under review] interfere with the power of a state to appoint electors or the
manner in which their appointment shall be made."o 3 However, the
Burroughs Court mirrored the reasoning in Yarbrough more than it did the
Article II analysis found in McPherson.'04 The Court, in its holding,
concluded:
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to
that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of
Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really
calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent
to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship
between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters

for congressionaldeterminationalone.'05

language."'

Id. at 99 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000

ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 156 (2001)).

103. 290 U.S. 534, 544 (1934). Burroughs violated the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 that
required "any political committee accepting contributions or making expenditures in two or more
states for the purpose of influencing the election of candidates for presidential elector to render
certain financial reports." Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 34. Burroughs was the treasurer of a political
committee and as treasurer he was supposed to produce statements when contributions were made to
the committee. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 543. Burroughs, in furtherance of a conspiracy with the
chairman of the committee, failed to file these statements required under the Act. Id
104. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545 (noting in the dicta: "To say that Congress is without power to
pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to
influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.
Congress,undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve
the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether
threatened by force or by corruption." (emphasis added)).
105. Id. at 547-48 (emphasis added). "Burroughs by its terms suggests that federal legislation
should stand if it genuinely 'seeks to preserve the purity of presidential and vice presidential
elections."' Coenen & Larson, supra note 7, at 894 (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544). Arguments
have been levied against congressional control over the "manner" of presidential elections. Id at
899. One argument draws on Congress's power to control the "Time Places, and Manner" of
congressional elections found in Article 1, Section 4, and the "time" of selecting presidential electors
in Article II, Section 1. Id "The argument that arises is one from negative implication. If Congress
may govern the 'Times, Places and Manner' of congressional elections, but only the 'Time' of
presidential elections, then Congress should not be able to control the 'Manner' of presidential
elections, including the manner in which citizens cast their votes." Id For a rebuttal to this
argument, see supra note 65. Additionally, Coenen and Larson argue that Article I, Section 4 may
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In Oregon v. Mitchell,06 the Court had to consider whether the Voting
Rights Act of 1970 was constitutional because the Act "proscribed states'
disqualifications of voters in presidential and vice presidential elections on
the grounds that they failed to meet residency requirements."'07 Justice
Black, who provided the Court's fifth vote, noted:
Acting under its broad authority to create and maintain a national
government, Congress unquestionably has power under the
Constitution to regulate federal elections. The Framers of our

Constitution were vitally concerned with setting up a national
government that could survive. Essential to the survival and to the
growth of our national government is its power to fill its elective
offices and to insure that the officials who fill those offices are as
responsive as possible to the will of the people whom they
represent. 08
Since Burroughs and Mitchell, a few cases have attempted to change the
tide of congressional control over presidential elections and revert back to
the McPherson court reasoning.'09

The first case, Cousins v. Wigoda,"o

supported congressional control in the majority opinion, reasoning "[t]he

be a source of power for Congress to control the manner of presidential elections. Id. at 916-17.
They posit that if Congress uses its power to create a uniform national ballot for senators and
representatives then it may be able to include presidential candidates too. Id. "The Necessary and
Proper Clause suggests that [Congress] may do so as a means to accomplish the purposes of its
power to regulate congressional elections." Id.
106. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
107. Siegel, supra note 26, at 409-10. The Voting Rights Act made discriminatory practices in
relation to voting illegal. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/faq.php#faq03 (last visited Oct.
8, 2009). Some of the laws the Act banned were compulsory literacy tests and requiring a registered
voter to vouch for the prospective voter's "good character." Id. The Act "gave private citizens the
right to sue in federal court to stop" discriminatory practices. Id The Court upheld most of the
Act's provisions. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118 (holding "Congress can enfranchise 18-year-old citizens
in national elections, but . . . cannot extend the franchise to 18-year-old citizens in state and local
elections").
108. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added).
109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). During the 1972 Illinois primary, voters elected the Wigoda delegates
to the Democratic National Convention. Id. at 478-79. However, some of the delegates (Cousins
delegates) challenged the seating of the Wigoda delegates on the grounds that the "slate-making
procedures under which the Wigoda delegates were selected violated Party guidelines incorporated
in the Call of the Convention." Id at 479. The Credential Committee agreed with the Cousins
delegates and ordered the Wigoda delegates to be unseated and the Cousins delegates seated in their
place. Id. The Wigoda delegates received an injunction against the Cousins delegates, which the
Cousins delegates ignored and took their seats as the rightful delegates. Id at 480-81. The Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed the injunction, holding "that 'the right to sit as a delegate representing
Illinois at the national nominating convention is governed exclusively by the Election Code."' Id. at
481 (citing Wigoda v. Cousins, 302 N.E. 2d 614, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)).

1130

[Vol. 37: 1113, 2010]

Importing Democracy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of
the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.""' However,
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence, disagreed with the majority, citing
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution as specifically granting states the
power to appoint presidential electors.12
Similarly, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, Justice Rehnquist dissented from
the majority again citing Article II, Section 1 and this time adding language
from McPherson v. Blacker:

This provision, one of few in the Constitution that grants an express
plenary power to the States, conveys "the broadest power of
determination" and "[i]t recognizes that [in the election of a
President] the people act through their representatives in the
legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the
method of effecting the object."' '"

Regardless of Justice Rehnquist's impassioned reading of the
Constitution, the majority in Anderson felt "the State has a less important
interest in regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections,
because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by voters
beyond the State's boundaries."' 14
The most recent return to state supremacy over presidential elections
came in the 2000 decision, Bush v. Gore (Bush II)."' This decision arose

after a number of state court decisions, namely Bush v. Palm Beach County

111. Id. at 489-90.
112. Id. at 495. Interpreting the Article too strictly would rule out congressional control as found
in Burroughs. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. "[I]f states, and states alone, have
power to control every aspect of the 'Manner' of voting, even this starkly permissible exercise of the
Burroughs power would become unconstitutional." Coenen & Larson, supranote 7, at 903.
113. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806-07 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)) (alteration in original). In Anderson, the Ohio
Secretary of State refused to accept Anderson's statement of candidacy on the grounds that the
statement had not been filed within the timeframe required by Ohio's statute. Id. at 780.
114. Id at795.
115. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). "Bush goes where no prior Court had gone: it applies broad and novel
equality norms to the way governments count votes." Marshall Camp, Note, Bush v. Gore: Mandate
for Electoral Reform, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 409, 420 (2002). Generally, the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over how a state court interprets its own laws. Ronald Dworkin,
Introduction, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 1, 16-17. However, the Court used Article II,
Section I as permission to investigate whether Florida courts "usurped the Florida legislature's
power by, in effect, changing the election statute after the election was over." Id. at 17.
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In Bush I, the Supreme Court reviewed a
decision issued by the Florida Supreme Court resolving Florida election
code problems by mandating certain recounts."' The Court took notice of
the fact that the Florida Supreme Court had relied on Florida's Constitution
in addition to the statutes issued by the state legislature."' 8 The Court held
this was problematic because Article II, Section 1 specifically grants the
state legislature the authority to regulate elections." 9 The Court remanded
the decision because it was "unclear as to the extent to which the Florida
Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the
legislature's authority" under Article II, Section 1.120
The case returned to the Supreme Court in Bush II.121 The per curiam
opinion relied heavily on the principles established in McPherson, stating
broadly at the beginning of its analysis:
Canvassing Board (Bush

1).116

[T]he state legislature's power to select the manner for appointing
electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself,
which indeed was the manner used by state legislatures in several
States for many years after the framing of our Constitution ....
When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its
people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental.... The State, of course, after granting the franchise in
the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint

electors.1 22

116. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text, for a brief history of the
events leading up to the Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Bush v. Gore.
117. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 73-77.
118. Id. at 77. One author argues the Court intentionally injected itself into the election by issuing
this decision to stay the recount and remand the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. Elizabeth
Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT 38,
48 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). Garrett argues the Florida Supreme Court
would have issued a decision providing "more specific standards for determining a voter's intent in a
recount ... had it not been convinced that such routine statutory interpretation would be struck down
by [the Court] under an Article II analysis." Id. at 46. Thus, the Court's remand in Bush I, basically
guaranteed a Bush II overturning the Florida Supreme Court's decision on an "equal protection
argument not deemed worthy of certiorari at the time the Court considered [Bush I]." Id.
119. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 76. "The most dramatic suggestion in Bush I is the possibility that Article
II, Section I of the U.S. Constitution might immunize state legislatures, when they enact presidential
elector statutes, from the state constitutional limitations that would otherwise channel and
circumscribe the state legislature." ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supranote 80, at 48.
120. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 78. "The Supreme Court thus sketched a rough outline of an Article 11
'independent legislature' doctrine. Under this doctrine, a state legislature directing the manner of
appointing electors pursuant to Article II operates with independence from its own state
constitution." Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 731, 734 (2001).
121. Bush v. Gore (Bush II), 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
122. Id. at 104 (citations omitted).
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The rest of the per curiam opinion deviated from this analysis of Article II,
Section I and instead discussed how the recount procedures in Florida
violated equal protection. 123
In their concurrence,1 24 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas did not cite equal protection as the reason to overturn the
Florida Supreme Court; instead, their decision relied heavily on a state's
right to conduct presidential elections:
[I]n a Presidential election the clearly expressed intent of the
legislature must prevail. . . . For the [Florida Supreme Court] to step
away from this established practice, prescribed by the Secretary, the
state official charged by the legislature with "responsibility to . . .
[o]btain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and
interpretation of the election laws,". . . was to depart from the
legislative scheme. 125

123. Id. at 104-10. "In the scramble to find a suitable constitutional principle on which to rest its
distrust of the Florida events, the Court finally settled on a sweeping but rather vague rendition of
equal protection." Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 118, at 55, 68. This was the first Supreme Court decision to apply an
equal protection analysis to election administration. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION
LAW 299 (2008). "As a result, black Americans-the people the equal protection clause was
designed to protect-had their ballots disqualified at shockingly high rates in Florida." Guinier,
supra note 25, at 237.
Generally, an equal protection case deals with a "class" or "group" of people. Camp, supra
note 115, at 420-21. However, Bush v. Gore is unique because the Florida voters whose votes were
affected cannot be categorized into a specific group or class; "in other words, there is no
classification effected by the judicial recount scheme." Id. at 423. The novelty of the opinion is that
the equal protection holding found "that uneven treatment of voters, even if not occurring on the
basis of group or class membership, may violate the Constitution." Id. at 424. One author notes the
absurdity of the holding by arguing that the same standard was used for both Bush voters and Gore
voters. Richard A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome
in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 118, at
13, 17.
124. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). "[T]he fairest way to characterize the
vote is 7-2 to hold unconstitutional the Florida system for manual recounts, but only 5-4 to stop the
recounting, rather than remand to Florida for further counting under a revised, and constitutional,
system." GREENE, supra note 3, at 117. Besides this concurrence, Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer each wrote separate dissents (although they were also joined in
some degree by the other dissenting Justices). Id. "Justices Souter and Breyer, although dissenting
from the disposition of the case halting further manual recounts, were in substantial agreement with
the majority's conclusion that the Florida system violated the equal protection clause." Id.
125. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted). The Chief Justice's
concurrence argued for a super-strong independent legislature doctrine language not found in the
Constitution: "After all, the Framers did not confer on Article Il legislatures the power to 'chuse'
[sic] electors, as they had given Article I, Section 3 legislatures, but only the power to 'direct' the
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Ultimately, the Court decided to stop the manual recount "because there
was insufficient time to establish satisfactory vote-counting rules and still
complete the recount by December 12, 2000."l 26
The various cases extending Congress's power, tempered by the
Delegates' concern about an executive controlled by Congress, 127 have
created a situation today where "states have initial authority, but Congress
serves as a backstop, able to change existing state rules whenever it deems
necessary."l 28
IV.

RECENT EVENTS: THE 2000 ELECTION AND THE
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT

Following the greatly debated 2000 presidential election, Congress
passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)1 29 as a means to fix the

'manner' of their appointment." Smith, supra note 120, at 736, 754. An alternative reading of
Article II, Section I is that "reference to 'the Legislature' denotes the lawmaking power of the state,
as that is customarily exercised" rather than the strict reading from the concurrence in which "Article
II confers a federal shield on the state legislature's command." Schapiro, supra note 102, at 92. In
the concurrence's opinion, "State legislation, not the state constitution, constitutes the ultimate state
authority governing presidential elections." Id. The concurrence created a hierarchy of state law
where state courts were the authoritative interpreters of the state's law only if their decision relied on
statutes rather than the state's constitution. Id. at 114.
126. Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse., in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY 20, 21 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002). See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). The December 12 date was not a deadline per se but a "safe harbor" date created by
federal law. Rubenfeld, supra, at 22. If states submit their votes by this date then their resolution
will not be challenged when Congress counts the votes in January. Id However, the December 12
deadline is not required by federal law, but Florida state law. Id The majority was honoring the
deadline "out of deference to . . . the Florida Supreme Court, . . . that august authority to which the

United States Supreme Court refused to defer on virtually any other point of law in the entire
controversy." Id. at 23. Yet the Florida Supreme Court never declared December 12 as the
deadline. Id. The majority maneuvered around this discrepancy by reasoning "[t]he Florida
Supreme Court ... had held that Florida law was designed so that Florida could 'participate fully in
the federal electoral process."' Id. at 24 (quoting Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110).
In other words, to decide Bush v. Gore the way it did, the majority had to do something it
pretended it wasn 't doing and couldn't do (decide a matter of state law) by pretending
that the Florida justices had done something they hadn't done and, supposedly, couldn't
do (set a deadline of December 12 for the completion of the election contest, even though
this deadline was nowhere expressed or even implied by Florida's election code).
Id. at 25-26.
127. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
128. Siegel, supra note 26, at 422; see Michael M. Uhlmann, Federalism and Election Reform, 6
TEX. REv. L. & POL. 491, 502-03 (2002) (noting Congress's expanded power over election
administration). For instance, Congress felt it necessary to protect presidential elections from
violence and corruption in Exparte Yarbrough, see supranotes 87-93 and accompanying text.
129. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15306 (2006); see Robert A. Pastor,
The US Administration of Elections: Decentralized to the Point of Being Dysfunctional, in
ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT DESIGN: THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 274 (2006), available

at http://www.idea.int/publications/emd/upload/EMDCSUSA.pdf
national law addressing the issue of electoral administration").
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problems from the 2000 election.130 In that election, the focus shifted to
Florida because the electoral count was so close that whoever won Florida
would win the election.13' However, the election was far from smooth in
Florida mainly because of the type of technology used.132
Several precincts used the "punch card balloting" system in which the
voter had to punch through the ballot next to the candidate of his or her
choice. Many of these ballots "did not register in the vote-counting
machines because voters failed to punch entirely through the card or selected
more than one candidate."' 3 Other Florida precincts used the "butterfly
ballot," whose design confused voters many of whom "inadvertently cast a
ballot for a candidate whom they did not prefer, or had chosen more than
34
one candidate for President, thereby voiding the ballot altogether."
Despite the faulty technology, the real problems arose when the ballots
were recounted because of the closeness of the election.'3 1 "The recounts,
and the procedures associated with them, resulted in both political
campaigns filing numerous suits in state and federal court."3 6 Eventually,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and delivered a decision in Bush v.
Gore. 37 The HAVA was created to address these problems, but some critics
believe the Act does not go far enough. 3 1

130. R. Bradley Griffin, Note, Gambling with Democracy: The Help America Vote Act and the
Failure of the State to Administer FederalElections, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 509, 523 (2004). "Perhaps
the most important lesson learned in the aftermath of the 2000 elections was that an election
controversy could easily recur if voting systems, registration, and administration are not thoroughly
improved on a national basis." Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 595
(2003).
131. Griffin, supra note 130, at 518.
132. GREENE, supranote 3, at 29.
133. Griffin, supra note 130, at 519.
134. Id. As a result of faulty technology, "approximately 2.9% of all ballots cast in Florida
(approximately 180,000 of 6 million) did not contain a valid vote for president." Daniel P. Tokaji,
Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,Disenfranchisement,and the Help America Vote Act,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1206, 1209 (2005). In addition to technological blunders, "'countless
eligible voters' were wrongly denied the opportunity to vote or purged from registration lists due to
errors on the part of state and local election officials in Florida." Id. at 1209-10.
135. "The final official tally gave Bush the edge by fewer than 1000 votes, with over ten times
that many disputed ballots in Miami-Dade County alone." Coenen & Larson, supranote 7, at 872.
136. Griffin, supranote 130, at 519.
137. See supranotes 121-26 and accompanying text.
138. Griffin, supra note 130, at 526 (noting "[t]he Act leaves too much power in the hands of the
very governments historically proven to be incompetent in securing adequate voting procedures: the
states"); Tokaji, supra note 134, at 1207 (arguing "[the] changes in federal law have arguably made
things worse instead of better, at least in the short term").
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A.

The Help America Vote Act

Title I of the Act authorizes Congress to distribute $650 million to the
states to improve election administration and replace punch card and lever
voting machines. 3 9 "States that choose not to accept federal funds must
either certify to the [Election Assistance Commission] that they have
established state administrative complaint procedures or submit to the
Attorney General a 'compliance plan' that explains how the state will satisfy
Title III's requirements."l 40
Title II establishes the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to "serve
as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information
and review of procedures with respect to the administration of Federal
elections . . . .".41 The members of the EAC are appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.142 To achieve a bipartisan Commission, the
Senate Majority Leader, Senate Minority Leader, Speaker of the House, and
the House Minority Leader may all submit a candidate recommendation to
the President.143 "Despite the broad grant of duties, and its intentional
bipartisan composition, the EAC does not have the ability to make rules
binding upon the states."'" Thus, the EAC is largely a toothless body.145
Title III, arguably the most important section in the Act,14 6 outlines the
standards for voting technology, provisional voting, voting identification,
and creation of a statewide voter registration database.14 "To comply with

139. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15306 (2006). In addition to replacing
voting machinery, states can use the money to educate voters, train election officials and poll
workers, improve the accessibility and quantity of polling places, and establish hotlines voters may
call to report fraud or voting rights violations. Audra L. Wassom, The Help America Vote Act of
2002 and Selected Issues in Election Law Reform, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 357, 360 (2004).
140. Kim, supra note 130, at 589. Many reformers felt Congress should have mandated these
reforms rather than incentivizing them. Wassom, supra note 139, at 361. The incentive plan was
included because many thought enforcement of mandates would be too costly and difficult, plus
states' rights advocates lobbied hard against them. Id.
141. § 15322. The EAC is "responsible for accrediting laboratories to test and certify voting
systems throughout the country." Wassom, supra note 139, at 363. The EAC must also conduct
studies regarding election administration, including what kind of system and technology will be the
most convenient and accessible for voters, the most accurate and secure, nondiscriminatory and the
most efficient and cost-effective. Id.
142. § 15323(a)(1).
143. § 15323(a)(2). To carry out an action, the EAC needs approval from three of its four
members. Wassom, supra note 139, at 362.
144. Griffin, supranote 130, at 524. HAVA gave the EAC little power, yet states are still calling
for its demise. Elmendorf, supra note 5, at 427 ("In 2005, the National Association of Secretaries of
State passed a resolution calling on Congress to dissolve the EAC.").
145. "The EAC is not an electoral management body but primarily a mechanism for transferring
funds from the federal to the state governments to invest in new voting equipment and statewide
registration lists." Pastor, supra note 129, at 274.
146. Wassom, supra note 139, at 365.
147. §§ 15481-15485. Section III is Congress's attempt to mitigate future problems similar to
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Title III, a voting system must enable the voter to review his or her vote
selection before the ballot is cast and counted and allow the voter, if
necessary, to change or correct his or her vote."l 48
The Act requires voters to provide identification if they register to vote
by mail.149 "If the new voter wishes to vote in person at the polling station,
the voter must present a valid photo identification or a copy of a current
utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other
government document that shows his or her name and address." 5 o
Additionally, one of these documents must be submitted with a mail-in
ballot if the person is a new voter.'"' Despite these detailed provisions,
states and local governments have the discretion as to how they implement
Title III's provisions.15 2
Title IV allows the Attorney General to enforce the Act through
declaratory and injunctive relief."'
If state and local authorities fail to comply with voting systems
standards, provisional voting rules, statewide voter registration list
requirements, and procedures for registering by mail, the Attorney
General can bring a civil action against the state or local jurisdiction
in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief to
54
compel violators to comply.1
Title V establishes the college program to encourage students to help in the
administration of elections.'

those in Florida during the 2000 election. Wassom, supra note 139, at 365-66.
148. Kim, supranote 130, at 590.
149. § 15483(b).
150. Kim, supra note 130, at 593.
151. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(ii).
152. Kim, supra note 130, at 594. "[T]he new law aims to help the states retrieve authority over
the conduct of elections and to exercise it in a way that will permit some uniformity at the national
level." Pastor, supranote 129, at 274.
153. Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 430
(2004). One author believes these enforcement provisions "are not strong enough to adequately
monitor the reform of federal elections in this country." Wassom, supranote 139, at 376.
154. Kim, supra note 130, at 594. Additionally, the Act provides for the "[e]stablishment of statebased administrative complaint procedures to remedy grievances." § 15512(a).
155. Wassom, supranote 139, at 368.
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B. Reactions to the Act

While Bush v. Gore has been fairly controversial,'5 6 the HAVA has
not.1
One scholar believes the Act will likely not come under
constitutional attack because "[t]he changes Congress adopted are relatively
modest and give states a certain degree of flexibility in achieving
compliance."'1 Generally, if any criticism is rendered against the bipartisan
legislation, it is that the Act does not go far enough in changing how
elections are conducted.'59 But if Congress were to enact a more aggressive
proposal for electoral reform, it would be dangerously close to doing exactly
what the Framers sought to avoid.160
The HAVA attempted to take control of the reigns and dictate how
presidential elections should be administered without moving too far into the
states' territory.' 6 ' "By simply assuming authority over the manner of
presidential elections and setting new rules, the [HAVA] ignores the
arguments made at ratification and alters that balance, at least as foreseen by
the ratifiers."l62 Little by little, Congress has delegated more power to itself
to amend and ratify legislation that effectively changes who controls the
manner of elections.
57

156. Many books and articles have been written on the subject. See BUSH v. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supranote 126 (presenting a collection of articles debating the impact of
Bush v. Gore); GREENE, supra note 3 (dissecting every event that led up to the fateful decision in
Bush v. Gore); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 118 (noting that many
view the court's decision "as a travesty of constitutional law incapable of rational defense");
Uhlmann, supranote 128, at 503 (stating Bush v. Gore is a case that "bothers almost everyone").
157. For criticism against the Act, see Kim, supra note 130, at 597 ("On the whole, very few
legislators opposed the Help America Vote Act. Despite some controversial provisions, the Act is
the product of bipartisan compromise. The main thrust of opposition to the [Act] centered on the
identification requirements for first-time voters who registered by mail."); Pastor, supra note 129, at
274 ("It is clear that the law did not provide for sufficient uniformity or give the EAC sufficient
strength to ensure that all states would assure the voting rights of citizens."); Shambon, supra note
153, at 431 ("HAVA has the effect of moving from an environment of local control with loose state
and limited federal oversight to an environment of strong state control and loose federal oversight.").
158. Siegel, supra note 26, at 417.
159. See Wassom, supra note 139, at 398 ("HAVA must only be considered a first step in
reforming the many problems with our election system."); Griffin, supra note 130, at 526
("Furthermore, the Act does not contain sufficient measures to ensure that states will comply with
even the Act's mandatory provisions, or what the penalties are if states fail to comply.").
160. Siegel, supra note 26, at 418. "The Framers strove to avoid congressional control of the
Executive and believed that removing Congress from the process of presidential selection was the
best guarantee of independence from the legislature." Id.
161. See supranotes 139-55 and accompanying text.
162. Siegel, supra note 26, at 419.
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C. Elections of 2004 and 2008

The Act was very much a reaction to the specific problems from the
2000 election. 163 Indeed, many of the pitfalls from the 2004 and 2008
elections highlight the need for a more fundamental change in voting
procedures.'" Florida was at the center of election chaos during the 2000
election, but managed to avoid controversy in the 2004 election.165 Instead,
Ohio was the eye of the storm, experiencing "intense controversy over six
issues: (1) voting equipment, (2) registration forms, (3) provisional voting,
(4) the ID requirement, (5) challenges to voter eligibility, and (6) long
lines."l 66 Before Election Day, Democrats were litigating decisions made by
the Republican Secretary of State, Kenneth Blackwell.167 In the end, "the
focus on Ohio turned out to be correct because the election results hinged on
Ohio's 20 electoral votes."
The 2008 presidential election also experienced the downsides of
ineffective administration. During the election, long lines forced voters in
Virginia to wait more than five hours to vote.169 In addition to long lines,
"some voters received automated phone calls sending people to the wrong
polling place" and students at George Mason University received a fake
email stating the election had been moved to November 5.170 Florida was
not without its problems, as it experienced breakdowns with its electronic
voting machines.' 7 1 Though the Supreme Court did not decide the outcome

163. "The Help America Vote Act is not simply about making federal elections more accessible
and efficient; it also places an equally important emphasis on preventing voter fraud." Kim, supra
note 130, at 593.
164. See Griffin, supra note 130, at 527-28 (discussing the 2004 election).
165. See generallyTokaji, supra note 134, at 1209.
166. Id. at 1220. "Rather than representing a step forward in improving our broken voting
process, we now realize that the flaws and gaps in HAVA and its implementation, coupled with a
highly charged campaign season in 2004, led to continued obstacles for the American voting
process." Tova Andrea Wang, Competing Values or False Choices: Coming to Consensus on the
Election Reform Debate in Washington State and the Country, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 353, 358
(2005).
167. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 123, at 303-04 (noting that Secretary Blackwell's decisions
included "provisional votes cast by a voter in the wrong precinct would not be counted and that voter
registration forms printed on paper not of sufficient weight were to be rejected . . .").
168. Id. at 304 (noting the preliminary results had Bush with a 136,000-vote lead over Kerry, with
only 153,000 provisional ballots yet to be included in the total).
169. Melissa Block & Pam Fessler, On Election Day, Some Glitches Reported, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=96588511.
170. Id.
171. Ari Shapiro, Roundup: Voting Snags in Key States, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Nov. 4, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-96588511 ("[P]oll workers responded to
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of the 2008 election, glitches such as these emphasize the need for
fundamental reform.
Many reformers focus on the Electoral College and the need for a new
system. 172 However, converting to direct election or some other kind of
system will not fix the problems experienced during the last three
elections. 73 These problems are fundamentally related to the lack of proper
administration of presidential elections.174 A change in the type of system
will not eliminate long lines at the polls or fix recount procedures, but
reforming how elections are administered and who is responsible for the
logistics will go a long way in effectuating real change.
V.

A LOOK AROUND THE GLOBE

One way to find new ways of administering elections is to analyze the
electoral systems 7 1 of other countries. The practice of looking abroad is
embodied in the term "comparative law."176 Studying other cultures and

those breakdowns appropriately by issuing paper ballots and placing the completed ballots in
lockboxes, but when those boxes filled up, poll workers started storing ballots in duffel bags or in
piles on the floor.").
172. See, e.g., George W. Norris, Abolition of the ElectoralCollege, in DIRECT ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 5, at 195, 195 (advocating for direct election rather than the Electoral
College); Burdett A. Loomis et al., Electoral College Reform, the Presidency, and Congress, in
CHOOSING A PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND BEYOND, supra note 5, at 74 (arguing for
a plurality vote system as the best possibility for a clear and legitimate winner).
173. See supra notes 132-38, 163-71 and accompanying text.
174. The Electoral College determines how many votes a candidate wins, but not the manner in
which these votes are collected. See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
175. "[E]lectoral systems are devised to accommodate a diversity of concerns, but no particular
electoral system, no matter how sophisticated, can accommodate them all in their entirety. Choices
have to be made. On what basis are such choices to be made?" Nicholas Aroney, Democracy,
Community, and Federalism in Electoral Apportionment Cases: The United States, Canada, and
Australiain ComparativePerspective,58 U. TORONTO L.J. 421, 423 (2008).
176. "Comparative constitutional law is a complex, multifaceted, and contested undertaking. Its
emphasis can be either descriptive or normative, and many different approaches can be adopted." Id.
at 424. Aroney goes on to explain the various approaches to comparative constitutional law. First,
he describes an approach that takes into account each system's "particularity" and "uniqueness." Id.
With this approach, "[e]ach system of law is seen as the unique 'expression' of the culture, history,
and traditions of the particular people from whom it emerges." Id. However, under this approach
the ability to "borrow" from another culture's legal system is lessened and "the capacity of
comparative inquiry to provide guidance for the resolution of practical problems of constitutional
design and interpretation is radically undermined." Id. at 425.
A second approach emphasizes the universal norms and values in each culture's system-an
approach quite opposite to the first. Id. Rather than focusing on differences between systems, legal
anthropologists expect similarities. Id. This approach "also provides strong grounds upon which to
think that comparative constitutional law can provide guidance for the resolution of problems of
interpretation under particular constitutions." Id.
A third intermediate approach provides for the possibility of a genuine comparison between
legal systems, but roots its study of these systems in historical facts. Id. This approach looks for
situations where one system has influenced another, "so that the constitutional law of other countries
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modes of being is important for various reasons and can be especially
beneficial when studying the law.' 7 For instance, comparative law allows
scholars to know what kinds of legal systems are currently in use, how these
systems can be perfected, and how to contribute to or create a body of
unified legal study.' 78 This section seeks to accomplish these goals by
examining the electoral systems of Germany-because of its innovative use
of a mixed electoral system, India-because of its well-known electoral
commission, and Australia-because of its use of compulsory voting.
A.

Germany

After World War II, the Parliamentary Councill 79 established a new
electoral system borrowing ideas from two different systems:1so proportional

can possess no authority except where a genealogical or genetic relationship can be demonstrated."
Id. at 425-26.
The fourth approach "takes as its starting point the assumption that there are particular kinds of
problems of human coordination and social ordering that arise in all societies and that it is possible
and meaningful to compare how different societies address those problems." Id. at 426. This view
is more functional in nature and posits that cultures can improve their own systems by learning from
and looking at other cultures' systems. Id. This Comment follows the fourth approach, as the author
believes systems can learn from and adapt to other ways of being.
177. This does not mean the process is easy "since true comparisons must allow for differences in
political development and culture." Graeme Orr et al., Australian Electoral Law: A Stocktake, 2
ELECTION L.J. 383, 401 (2003).
178. This is not a new notion; for instance, the European Union has codified many laws that are
applied to all the countries that make up the Union.
See Europa, Treaties and Laws,
http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
179. The West German Constitution, otherwise known as the "Basic Law" created the electoral
system: "It was thus a result of inter-party bargaining between democratic forces in West Germany."
Michael Krennerich, Germany: The Original Mixed Member Proportional System,
http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/DE/case-studies/germany-the-originalmixed-member-proportional-system (last visited Oct. 13, 2009). The Basic Law does not delineate a
specific type of system, but "does require such a system to be general, direct, free, equal and secret
(Article 38)." GEOFFREY K. ROBERTS, GERMAN ELECTORAL POLITICS 11-12 (2006).
180. The three basic systems are: (1) plurality-the winning candidate receives more votes than
the other candidates; (2) majority-the winning candidate receives more than half the votes cast; and
(3) proportional representation-where political parties are represented in parliament
proportionately to the percentage of votes they received. Blais & Massicotte, supra note 1, at 41.
"The dominant debate in the literature has been between plurality and PR systems. The basic
argument in favor of the plurality rule is that it produces one-party majority government, while PR is
advocated because it produces broad and fair representation." Id at 61. One-party majority
governments are thought to be better because they are more stable than coalition governments. Id.
However, research is still inconclusive as to whether there is a relationship between government and
political stability. Id. One-party majority governments are also thought to be more accountable
because their elections are decisive. Id. "An election is decisive when it has a direct and immediate
impact on the formation of government." Id.
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representations18 and single-member district voting. 18 2 While revolutionary
at the time, the "Mixed Member Proportional" (MMP)'18 system has gained
popularity in recent years.
Every four years, Germans gather to vote for the 612 seats in the
Bundestag.'18 The system is unique in that each voter casts two votes. 86

On the other side, advocates of proportional representation argue their system is fair and
responsive. Id. at 62. "Almost by definition, PR is fair since it is intended to give each party a share
of seats more or less equal to its share of votes." Id. Thus choosing between systems is more about
what the government deems the most important-accountability and stability, or fairness and
responsiveness. Id.
As for the majority rule system, advocates propose this system because the very heart of
democracy is the majority principle. Id. "In a direct democracy, the majority wins and in a
representative democracy, most decisions are made by legislators through the majority rule. It
would thus seem natural to apply the same logic to the selection of representatives." Id Another
argument in favor of the majority rule is that it "offers a reasonable degree of both responsiveness
and accountability." Id. at 63. However, it may be a less satisfactory system with respect to
fairness. Id.
181. Ace Project, Germany: Delimiting Districts in a Mixed Member Proportional Electoral
System, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdyde (last visited Oct. 13, 2009) [hereinafter
Germany: Delimiting Districts]. Around sixty percent of democracies in place today use this type of
system. Blais & Massicotte, supra note 1, at 41. The proportional representation system is further
delineated into the list system and the single transferable vote. Id. at 45. "Devising a PR list system
involves making five major decisions as to districting, formula, tiers, thresholds, and preferences for
candidates. There are many different ways of combining these variables, which explains why no PR
systems are exactly alike." Id.
182. Germany: Delimiting Districts, supranote 181. This system has been defined in many ways.
DAVID M. FARRELL, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 98 (2001).

Some

scholars believe this is a combination of the three electoral systems (plurality, majority, and
proportional representation) for the election to a single body, while others pose a more narrow
definition in which the mixed system is a variant of the two-tier system. Id.
183. In New Zealand, the system is known as a "Mixed Member Proportional" system whereas in
Germany the electoral system is called a "personalized proportional system" ("Personalisierte
Verhlltniswahl"). Krennerich, supra note 179. See Robert Johns, AMS in Germany - and in
Britain?, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT, 2004, http://www.democraticaudit.eu/download/C-GermanAMS.doc. Johns asserts these mixed member systems are popular because they offer the "'best of
both worlds': a direct line of accountability between voters and their local representatives, and
proportionality in order to represent a full range of party preferences." Id.
184. Germany: Delimiting Districts, supra note 181. New Zealand and Albania have adopted
similar systems, while Japan, Russia, and Italy have created electoral systems "involv[ing] a similar
mix of single-member districts and list mandates." Kathleen Bawn, Voter Responses to Electoral
Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 29 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 487, 488 n.5 (1999). Germany's system is not the only way to
create mixed systems. Blais & Massicotte, supra note 1, at 54. "The simplest way . . . is to apply
PR in some parts of the national territory, and either plurality or majority everywhere else." Id.
Another way to create a mixed system is to have two tiers of members some of whom are elected by
the PR system and the others elected through the plurality or majority systems. Id. A third type is
best exemplified by the German electoral system "where PR seats are distributed in a corrective
way, so as to compensate weaker parties that did poorly in single-member seats and to produce a
parliament where each party gets its fair share of seats." Id. at 54-55. For a comprehensive review
of Germany's unique system, see FARRELL, supra note 182, at 97-112.
185. The Bundestag is Germany's Parliament, "stand[ing] at the centre of the country's political
life and is its supreme democratic organ of state." German Bundestag, The German Parliament,
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The first vote (Erststimme)-similar to the American system-is cast for
"an individual candidate running to represent a particular electoral
district."'17 The candidate who receives the largest number of votes from the
district's constituency is elected.'" The second vote (Zweitstimme) is cast
for a particular party'"9 rather than an individual candidate.' 90 These votes
are tallied at the state level rather than nationwide.' 9' Party candidates will
only be seated if the party passes the legal threshold.192 If the party passes
the five percent threshold, then Bundestag seats are distributed
93
proportionately to the total number of votes the party received;1

http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/index.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). The members
of the lower house are directly elected whereas the members of the upper house are appointed by the
states. Germany: Delimiting Districts, supra note 181. The electorate votes for the German
parliament and not the Chancellor: "Every four years, after national elections and the seating of the
newly elected Bundestag members, the federal president nominates a chancellor candidate to that
parliamentary body; the chancellor is elected by majority vote in the Bundestag." German Culture,
The Chancellor of Germany, http://www.germanculture.com.uallibrary/facts/bl_chancellor.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2009).
186. Krennerich, supra note 179. The two-vote system allows voters to split their votes between
two parties, a common practice for those who support smaller parties. Id
Since candidates of smaller parties have little chance of winning a single-member district,
their supporters frequently give their first vote to a constituency candidate from the larger
coalition party. Similarly, supporters of bigger parties may 'lend' their second vote to a
minor party within the coalition, in order to ensure that it will pass the legal threshold.
Id. For an excellent article examining voters' ability to strategically split their votes, see Bawn,
supra note 184.
187. Germany: Delimiting Districts, supra note 181. The candidates voted for represent one of
Germany's 328 single-member constituencies. Id. The first vote represents the single-member
district representation style of electoral systems. Id The purpose of the personal vote is to "ensure a
close relationship between voters and their representatives." Krennerich, supra note 179.
188. Germany: Delimiting Districts, supranote 181.
189. Even though this is considered a party vote, "[clandidates are allowed to compete in singlemember districts as well as simultaneously for the party list." Krennerich, supra note 179.
190. Id "[E]ach party will receive a percentage share of Bundestag seats corresponding to its
percentage share of list votes (sometimes called 'second' votes)." ROBERTS, supranote 179, at 14.
191. Bawn, supra note 184, at 489. "Winning a large number of districts thus does not generally
increase a party's seat share beyond its proportional allocation, so that the mechanical effect of
district races is wiped out." Id.
192. For a party to pass the threshold, it needs to receive at least five percent of all the second
votes that were cast, "except for parties which have won at least three constituency seats. A party
winning one or two constituency seats retains these .. . but receives no additional seats." ROBERTS,
supra note 179, at 15. This five percent threshold distinguishes the German system from pure
proportional representation because very small parties are excluded from parliamentary
representation. Krennerich, supra note 179.
193. ROBERTS, supra note 179, at 14. One complicating factor is that it is possible for a party to
win more seats than are available. This happens
[b]ecause any constituency seats won cannot be taken away from a candidate or party,
and because calculation of seats awarded to party lists is done on a Land-by-Land basis, it
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"[h]owever, the total seats allocated include any constituency seats won by

the party."l 94
B. India

India shares several similarities with the United States. First, India has a
federal form of government. 9 5 The central govemment is pattemed after the
British parliamentary system granting the national government greater
power in relation to its states. 196 Second, India elects its President using an
electoral college.' 97 Third, India's branches of government resemble those
of the United States whereby "[e]xecutive power is exercised by the
government. Federal legislative power is vested in both the government and

is possible for a party to have won more constituency seats in a Land than its total
allocation of seats in that Land. . . . Such surplus seats [Ueberhangmandate] are
additional to the total proportional allocation for that party.
Id. at 15.
194. Id. For example, if a hundred seats are available and party "A" receives sixty percent of the
vote, then that party would receive sixty seats. However, if fifteen party "A" members were elected
directly by the district's constituents (i.e., they received a plurality of the first votes that were cast),
then these fifteen seats would be subtracted from the party's total of sixty seats. The party would
then receive forty-five list seats in addition to their fifteen constituency seats. Id.
195. Ace Project, India: Description of Electoral System, http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eci/IN
(last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter India: Description of Electoral System]. Like the United
States, India's constitution grants significant control to the states over their own governments. "The
Vidhan Sabhas (legislative assemblies) is [sic] directly elected bodies set up to carrying [sic] out the
administration of the government in the 25 States of India." Indian Elections, The Electoral System
of India, http://www.indian-elections.conVelectoralsystem/reservationofseats.html (last visited Oct.
8, 2009) [hereinafter Reservation of Seats].
196. India: Description of Electoral System, supra note 195. In fact, the national government
can-and has-impose direct federal rule over the states, otherwise known as President's rule. Id.
197. Id. However, unlike the United States that vests the manner of voting in the states, see infra
Part II, India's Constitution vests the power in its parliament and state legislative assemblies to
indirectly elect the President and Vice President. Mahesh Rangarajan & Vijay Patidar, India: First
Past the Post on a Grand Scale, http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eci/fN/case-studies/india-first-pastthe-post-on-a-grand-scale-1997 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). "A formula is used to allocate votes so
there is a balance between the population of each state and the number of votes assembly members
from a state can cast, and to give an equal balance between state and national assembly Parliament
members."
Indian Elections, The Electoral System of India, http://www.indianelections.com/electoralsystem/presidentandvicepresident.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter
President and Vice President].
The United States' use of the Electoral College to elect its President is rare in the world's
democracies. Lutz et al., supranote 5, at 47. While some countries utilize this method, they usually
vest the power to elect the chief executive in the legislative body (for example, India, Germany, and
Australia). Id.
[T]he political system of the United States is just as unusual for its relentless separation
of powers, for its popularly elected executive, and for its two-party system as it is for its
Electoral College. Other democracies have not so much rejected the Electoral College, as
they have rejected an executive separate from the legislature.
Id.
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two chambers of the Parliament of India. The judiciary is independent of the
executive and the legislature."' 98
India uses the single transferable vote system'99 to elect both the
President and the members of the Rajya Sabha. 200 On election day, voters 201
receive a ballot that lists all the candidates up for election.202 Voters then list
the candidates in order of preference.203 Candidates must receive the
designated "quota" to win.2 With presidential elections, the candidate who
receives more than half the number of votes wins.205
The Vidhan Sabhas206 and Lok Sabha207 are elected using the first-pastthe-post electoral system-a system quite different than the single
transferable vote system.208 This electoral system is like the United States'
system because it uses "single member districts and candidate-centred
voting." 209 Voters receive a ballot with the candidates' names and vote by

198. India: Description of Electoral System, supra note 195. The Parliament is made up of the
Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). The President, who is the
head of state, appoints the Prime Minister "who runs the government, according to the political
composition of the Lok Sabha." Id. Whereas citizens directly elect the members of the Lok Sabha,
the members of the Rajya Sabha "are elected by each state Vidhan Sabha using the single
transferable vote system. Unlike most federal systems the number of members returned by each
state is roughly in proportion to their population." Id. In addition to these elected members, twelve
members of the Rajya Sabha are "nominated by the President as representatives of literature,
science, art and social services." Reservation of Seats, supra note 195.
199. Commentators and researchers tend to advocate for this type of system because it "does away
with party lists, thus giving voters more freedom" compared to the list system which gives parties
more control over which candidates are selected. Blais & Massicotte, supranote 1, at 53.
200. President and Vice President, supra note 197.
201. "Voters" in presidential elections are elected members of the Vidhan Sabhas (state
governments), and the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (Parliament). Id; see supra note 198 and
accompanying text (describing who elects the members of the Rajya Sabha).
202. President and Vice President, supra note 199.
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Id.
For the Rajya Sabha the quota is set at the number of votes that can be attained by just
enough MPs to fill all the seats but no more. Votes that are deemed surplus, those given
to candidates who have already got a full quota of votes, or votes given to candidates who
are deemed to be losing candidates, are transferred according to the voter's listed
preferences, until the right number of candidates have been elected.
Id.
206. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
208. Reservation of Seats, supra note 195.
209. Ace Project, First Past the Post, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd0l/esd0la!
default/?searchterm=first%20past%20the%20post (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). The U.S. system is
slightly different because of the Electoral College. Blais & Massicotte, supra note 1, at 42. Even
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choosing only one of the candidates. 2 '0 The candidate who receives the most
votes, wins.21 l
India's system of elections is unique because of its Election
Commission.2 12 The Commission has vested constitutional power 2l for the
"superintendence, direction and control of the entire process for conduct of
elections to Parliament and Legislature of every State and to the offices of
President and Vice-President of India." 214 The Commission determines the
election schedule, polling place locations, voter polling stations, vote
counting locations, and all of the logistics in and around the various
locations.215
The Commission is composed of the Chief Election Commissioner as
well as two Election Commissioners.2 16 These Commissioners appoint a
Chief Electoral Officer of the State to oversee, direct, and control elections

when a state employs the first-past-the-post system, the winner receives all of that state's electors
(also known as the bloc vote). Id. The two exceptions are Nebraska and Maine, which use
proportional representation and allocate electors based on the percentage of votes each candidate
receives. Schumaker, supra note 6, at 12. Until recently, Argentina also used the plurality system
coupled with an electoral college. Blais & Massicotte, supra note 1, at 43. However, in 1994 it
dissolved the electoral college and now the candidate who receives a plurality wins-but only if the
plurality is equal to or greater than forty-five percent of the vote or if the plurality exceeds forty
percent plus a lead of at least ten points over the next candidate. Id. at 43.
210. First Past the Post, supra note 209.
211. Id.
212. "The Election Commission of India is perhaps the leading real-world example of [an
independent commission]." Elmendorf, supra note 5, at 429. Many countries have sent election
officials to India to gain a better understanding of the Indian electoral process. These countries
include Russia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia, South Africa, Bangladesh, Thailand, Nigeria, Australia
and the United States. Ace Project, India: About the Election Commission, http://aceproject.org/eroen/regions/asia/IN/About/20Election%20Commission.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) [hereinafter
India: About the Election Commission].
213. The Election Commission was established by the Constitution on January 25, 1950 and is a
permanent constitutional body. India: About the Election Commission, supranote 212.
[Tihe founding fathers of the Indian constitution, while debating the position of the
election commission in the Constituent Assembly, ensured that the body responsible for
conducting elections in independent India should be a distinct one, separate from the
government of the day, and that it should have ample financial and administrative
autonomy to conduct its affairs.
Vijay Patidar & Ajay Jha, India: A Model of an Independent EMB 1, http://aceproject.org/eroen/regions/asiaIN/India%20-%20The%20Embodiment%20of/o20EMB%201ndependence.pd
f/view?setlanguage=fr.
214. India: About the Election Commission, supra note 212.
215. Id. "Conduct of General Elections in India for electing a new Lower House of Parliament
(Lok Sabha) involves management of the largest event in the world. The electorate exceeds 670
million electors in about 700,000 polling stations spread across widely varying geographic and
climatic zones." Id.
216. Id. These commissioners are appointed by the President and are similar in status to Indian
Supreme Court Judges. Id.

1146

[Vol. 37: 1113, 2010]

ImportingDemocracy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

on a state level. 2 17 Along with state-level commissioners, the Commission
has access to district level officers during election time.218
One compelling aspect of Indian elections is the Model Code of
Conduct. 21 9 The Code is designed to ensure an even playing field for the
parties and "is intended to maintain the election campaign on healthy lines,
avoid clashes and conflicts between political parties or their supporters and
to ensure peace and order during the campaign period and thereafter, until
the results are declared." 220 The Commission periodically meets with the
various political parties to make sure they are complying with the Model
Code.22 1
C. Australia
The Australian Constitution established the procedure by which the first
federal election took place in 1902.222 The Commonwealth Franchise Act of
1902 and the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1902 were passed shortly

217. Id. Each state has its own appointed officer who is generally full time with a small support
staff. Id.
218. Id. "The key officials at state level are the state chief electoral officers, who are selected by
the [Election Commission] from a shortlist of federal civil servants posted to the state drawn up by
the state government." Patidar & Jha, supra note 213, at 1. Overall, about five million polling
personnel and civil police forces are under the Commission's "supervision, discipline, and
control ... for the duration of an election." Id.
219. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE GUIDANCE OF
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES (2007), http://india.gov.in/allimpfrms/alldocs/1l949.pdf.
"During the election campaign the political parties and contesting candidates are expected to abide
by a Model Code of Conduct evolved by the Election Commission on the basis of a consensus
among political parties." Indian Elections, The Electoral System of India, http://www.indianelections.com/electoralsystem/campaign.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Campaign].
220. Campaign, supra note 219. "The [Election Commission] has done an excellent job of
enforcing its provisions and reining in the governing parties during election periods. At times it has
used this code to postpone elections in certain disputed electoral districts in the face of gross
violations of the code of conduct." Patidar & Jha, supranote 213, at 2.
221. India: About the Election Commission, supra note 212. The Commission also performs an
advisory function to "ensure[] that the electoral process can be completed on schedule, without
getting bogged down in judicial hearings." Patidar & Jha, supra note 213, at 2. Once the electoral
process is under way, courts cannot stop the process. Id.; cf supranotes 115-26 and accompanying
text (describing the role the U.S. Supreme Court played in the 2000 presidential election).
222. Australian Electoral Commission, A Short History of Federal Election Reform in Australia,
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Australian ElectoralHistory/history.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2009) [hereinafter A Short History]. The Australian electoral system is "widely considered one of
the most professionalized and efficient in the world. . . ." Kenneth R. Mayer, Comparative Election
Administration: Can We Learn Anything from the Australian Electoral Commission? 3 (Aug. 30,
2007), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mlaaparesearch citation/2/1/0/4/4/
pages210440/p210440-1 .php.
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thereafter, establishing crucial aspects of Australia's electoral system.223
The Commonwealth Electoral Act was rewritten in 1918,224 introducing the
alternative vote system (AV) 225 for the House, and in 1948 voting for the
Senate changed to the single transferable vote system (STV). 226 In 1924,

223. A Short History, supra note 222 ("[T]aken together [these acts] provided for a secret ballot,
votes for men and women (but not for aboriginals), and plurality ("first-past-the-post") voting for
both the Senate and the House of Representatives."). Aboriginals were finally given the right to vote
in 1962. Id.
224. Today, this Act is the main source of election law in Australia. David Bamford, Current
Issues in Australian ElectoralLaw, 1 ELECTION L.J. 253, 253 (2002). "The main characteristic of
the statute is its uniform and unitary nature: it applies to every federal election, implements identical
procedures in each legislative district .. . and covers every element of the electoral process." Mayer,
supra note 222, at 10.
225. Australia is known to have the most well-established and best-known AV system. Ben
http://aceproject.org/regions-en/usp/AU/caseVote,
The
Alternative
Reilly, Australia:
studies/australia-the-altemative-vote-1997 (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). With this system, voters rank
in order of their preference all the candidates on the ballot. DAVID M. FARRELL & IAN
MCALLISTER, THE AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ORIGINS, VARIATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

3 (2006). To win, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes-greater than fifty percent. Id.
If no candidate receives a majority of every voter's first preference, then the candidate with the least
amount of votes is eliminated and his or her votes are distributed to the remaining candidates in
order of the voters' next preferences. Id The process will continue until one candidate receives a
majority of the votes. Id. See Manuel Alvarez-Rivera, Election Resources on the Internet: Federal
Elections in Australia - The House of Representatives, http://www.electionresources.org/
au/house.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Australia's House of Representatives]; SCOTr
BENNETT & ROB LUNDIE, DEP'T OF PARLIAMENTARY SERV., AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
While many
4-12 (2007), http://www.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubs/RP/2007-08/08RPO5.pdf.
commentators have argued the unimportance of this type of system in Australian elections, these
arguments were based on 1950s and 60s federal elections. Reilly, supra note 225; FARRELL &
MCALLISTER, supra note 225, at 7. Today, preferences do impact the outcome of elections: "The
decline of what was a very stable two party system, the rise of minor parties, and the increasing
influence of independent candidates have all meant that the impact of preference voting has been
higher during the 1990s than at any time in the past." Id.
226. A Short History, supra note 222. The STV system is a type of proportional representation.
BENNETT & LUNDIE, supra note 225, at 12. The process of electing a candidate is similar to the AV
system except for one main difference. FARRELL, supra note 182, at 4. Instead of having only
single districts, STV occurs in multi-seat districts. Id. With multiple seats up for election, a quota is
established that determines the number of votes each candidate needs to be elected. Id The quota
system, while complicated, is explained below:
In each state and territory, Senate seats are awarded to candidates who attain the state or
territory quota, calculated by dividing the number of formal first preference votes cast in
the state or territory by one more than the number of seats to be filled, and then adding
one to the result. A candidate whose first preference vote totals equal or exceed the quota
is immediately elected; if the candidate obtained more first preference votes than the
quota, the surplus is distributed among the remaining candidates, in proportion to the
second preferences of all votes cast for the successful candidate. The surplus transfer
may result in the election of one or more candidates, in whose case the described
procedure is repeated. However, if there are unallocated seats after transferring surplus
votes from elected candidates, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is
eliminated, and the preferences of the eliminated candidate are transferred to the
remaining candidates. These two processes are repeated until all seats are filled, with
surplus transfers taking precedence over the exclusion of unsuccessful candidates.
Manuel Alvarez-Rivera, Election Resources on the Internet: Federal Elections in Australia - The
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Australia established compulsory voting "with criminal penalties for those
who fail to vote." 2 27 Finally, the last round of reforms occurred in 1983:
"The [Electoral Reform] Committee's work gave rise to such changes as the
printing of party affiliations on ballot papers, the introduction of party
financing laws, and the creation of the independent Australian Electoral
Commission." 228
Compulsory voting 229 is one of the most controversial aspects of
Australia's electoral system.2 30 The rationale behind compulsory voting was
to eliminate voter apathy. 231 Australian officials proved to be correct, and

Senate, http://www.electionresources.org/au/senate.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter
Australia's Senate]; see also BENNETT & LUNDIE, supra note 225, at 13-18.
227. Bamford, supra note 224, at 253.
All Australian citizens over the age of 18 (except those of unsound mind or those
convicted of serious crimes) must be registered to vote and show up at the poll on
election day. Australians who do not vote are subject to fines although those who were
ill or otherwise incapable of voting on election day can have their fines waived.
Matt Rosenberg, Compulsory Voting: Australia Is Well-Known for Its Compulsory Voting Laws,
http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/compulsoryvote.htm
(last visited Dec. 21,
2009).
228. A Short History, supra note 222. While Australia has been on the cutting edge of electoral
law in many ways, electronic voting is not one of them. FARRELL & MCALLISTER, supra note 225,
at 1. Today, Australia uses paper ballots and pencils rather than other more advanced voting
technologies. See Bamford, supra note 224, at 253; Phillip Green, The Politics of the Future: The
Internet and Democracy in Australia (Oct. 5, 2000), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific
/AU/PolFut.pdf (noting concerns with internet voting or voting on electronic machines stems from
the lack of security and high introductory costs); Mayer, supra note 222, at 10-11 n. 15 (noting the
Commission's acceptance of the fact that Australia was no longer the leading nation on electoral
issues).
229. Though this is the term used, voters are not required to actually vote; they are only compelled
to show up at the polling booth and take a ballot. See Chris Puplick, The Case for Compulsory
Voting, http://www.mind-trek.com/writ-dtf/votehoax/c-puplic.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009);
SCOTT BENNETT, DEP'T OF PARLIAMENTARY

SERV., COMPULSORY VOTING IN AUSTRALIAN

NATIONAL ELECTIONS 6 (2008), available at http://www.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubs/RB/200506/06rb06.pdf.
230. See BENNETT, supra note 229, at 2, 7-11 (arguing compulsory voting "will become a major
issue for public debate within the next two years"); Rosenberg, supra note 227; Derek Chong et al.,
Whichever Way You Dice It, Compulsory Voting Is Evil, CENTER FOR INDEP. STUD., Jan. 23, 2006,
http://www.cis.org.au/executivehighlights/EH2006/eh32906.html; Economicexpert.com, Australian
Electoral System, http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Australian:electoral:system.htm (last visited
Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Economic Expert]; Mayer, supra note 222, at 13 (stating that criticism of
Australia's system stems from equality and representation issues because in America "compulsory
voting would face enormous opposition as an infringement of individual liberties"). Despite its
controversial nature, compulsory voting is used in a number of countries: Belgium, Cyprus, Greece,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Panama, Singapore, Thailand, Fiji, Nauru and Egypt. BENNETT, supra note
229, at 6.
231. See BENNETT, supra note 229, at 3. Sydney Sampson supported compulsory voting in 1918
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"[i]n the decades since 1924, voter turnout has hovered around 94% to
96%,"232 whereas voting prior to 1924 was as low as 59.38%.233 Despite the
compulsory nature, Australia has tried to make elections as easy as possible
for voters by nominating Saturday as election day, providing easy-to-find
polling stations, and allowing absentee voting.234
Similar to India, Australia's elections are administered by a federal body
called the Australian Electoral Commission.235 The Commission regulates
the manner and process by which elections are conducted, leaving no room
for state or local governments to intervene.236 The Commission is
completely independent from political bias and has the reputation amongst
voters as being nonpartisan. 2 37 The Commission is made up of three
members-a federal judge, the head of the Commission, and someone who
holds an administrative position in the government. 238 A Parliamentary
minister is ultimately responsible for the oversight of this federal body and
holds the Commission accountable.239

"lament[ing] that many voters would not vote unless carried to the polling booth . . . [and] if all
people were to have equal electoral rights there was an obligation upon them to record their votes."
Id. Sampson's amendment was defeated because at the time 78.3% of voters were voting. Id.
However, in 1922 only 59.4% voted. Id. This sorry number "seemed to change the attitudes of
many . . . there was now 'a spirit abroad that something should be done to compel people who are
indifferent ... to go to the poll."' Id. (citing Albert Gardiner, Debates 2182 (July 17, 1924)).
232. Rosenberg, supra note 227.
233. See Economic Expert, supra note 230; BENNETr, supra note 229, at 12.
234. BENNETr, supranote 229, at 6.
235. Bamford, supra note 224, at 253.
236. Id.
237. "[The] electoral commissions are staffed with expert public servants. By law they cannot be
candidates, but more importantly, by strongly held convention they must renounce any formal party
membership. As a rule, as career public servants they have traditionally been exceptionally
apolitical." Orr et al., supra note 177, at 400. Additionally, "[t]here has never been a 'credible
[instance] of bias on the part of [the Commission] administrators."' Mayer, supra note 222, at 1213 (citing Bryan Mercurio & George Williams, Australian ElectoralLaw: 'Free and Fair'?,32 FED.
L. REv. 365, 382 (2004)).
238. Mayer, supra note 222, at 11. The Governor-General appoints these three members. Id. at
12. The Governor-General "is the Queen's Representative in Australia and Head of State.... In
practice, the Governor-General has little independent authority, and in almost all cases makes
decisions with the approval of the Prime Minister and Cabinet." Id. at 12 n.18.
239. Id. at 18 ("[T]he accountability of the strongly independent [Commission] is enforced by a
convention of ministerial responsibility, in which the minister responsible for overseeing the
[Commission] is held responsible for its conduct, and consistent parliamentary oversight by a
legislative committee (called the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters).").
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VI.

IMPROVING THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WITHIN THE CONFINES OF
ARTICLE II, SECTION 1

Akhil Amar believes the Electoral College was a "constitutional
accident waiting to happen." 240 The accident waiting to happen is what he
called "a clear Loser President," a situation in which a presidential candidate
loses the popular vote but wins the Electoral College, thus becoming
America's Loser President.24 1 Unfortunately, Amar's prediction in 1995 was
all too accurate, and in 2000 we saw how a Loser President could be
elected. 242 There is no doubt that the current system is broken and must be
fixed,243 but the mountain that reformers must climb is steep and firmly
embedded in American jurisprudence-Article II, Section 1.244
The following proposals for reform attempt to stay within the
constitutional boundaries created by Article 11,245 case law, 246 and legislation
enacted by Congress.24 7 Though the history of America's electoral system is
deep and well-settled, recent events have proven the possibility of enacting
change within the system. 248 These proposals build upon HAVA in an effort
to create a system similar to those abroad but still maintain a uniquely
American fingerprint-the Electoral College.

240. Akhil Reed Amar, A ConstitutionalAccident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 143,
143 (1995).
241. Id. at 145.
242. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
243. Ultimately, an electoral system should represent the will of the people, be transparent and
available to both voters and political parties, and work in an inclusive manner (including suffrage
and proper mechanisms, such as voting machines). Ace Project, Guiding Principles of Electoral
Systems, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/es20 (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
244. See supra Parts 11,III. Though the Electoral College is fraught with problems, it
appears to have one major and one minor advantage over any alternative. The major
advantage is its tendency, especially when combined with use of the general ticket and
'unit rule,' to marginalize third parties and exert a moderating influence on the political
delegates of the two predominant parties. The minor, but potentially crucial, advantage is
the safety valve of elector discretion, if only to respond to events between election day
and the casting of the electors' ballots.
Josephson & Ross, supranote 25, at 189.
245. See supra Part II.
246. See supra Part III.
247. See supra Part IV.A.
248. See supra Part IV.A.
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A. Creation ofa Non-PartisanElectoral Commission

The U.S. electoral system is incredibly decentralized.249 Instead of one
central body controlling election administration-as seen in the Indian and
Australian systems-the U.S. system is conducted not only by individual
states, 250 but even more so by the local governments in each state. 25 1 One
commentator noted that "[v]irtually every variable in the voting process ...
varies depending on where [the voter] live[s]."252
With this vast
decentralization, it is not surprising that ballots were confusing in the 2000
election; 253 voters were turned away from the polls in 2004;254 and long lines
accompanied by voting machine failures occurred in the 2008 election.255
Before HAVA, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) oversaw federal
elections.256 However, this Commission was virtually useless as it served
"mostly to regulate the campaign finance system for federal elections."257
The Act established a new body to oversee elections, the EAC,258 but this

249. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 123, at 281 (noting the limited role the federal
government has played in administering elections); Pastor, supra note 129, at 273 (noting elections
in the U.S. are more decentralized than in any other country). For a different view, see Uhlmann,
supranote 128, at 501 (arguing the benefits of having state and local governments administer federal
elections as a necessary component of radical decentralization).
250. Local governments may administer elections, but states create the statutory requirements for
election administration. Pastor, supra note 129, at 274. See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht,
Problems in America's Polling Places:How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.
REv. 401, 424-27 (2002), for examples of the types of laws states pass.
251. Mayer, supra note 222, at 5 (noting that over 10,000 different jurisdictions "with enormous
variation in the methods used from one place to another" conduct federal elections).
252. Id. at 5-6 (noting examples of variation in each locale are: "eligibility for ballot access; the
structure and design of the ballot; registration requirements to establish voter eligibility; distribution
of polling places; oversight mechanisms and authorities; the hours of voting; the physical process of
marking and submitting a ballot; counting methods; definition of a valid vote; standards for recounts;
[and] methods of resolving disputes").
253. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
254. In Ohio, if voters went to the wrong precinct, they were only allowed to cast a provisional
ballot if they were eligible to vote within that precinct. Tokaji, supra note 134, at 1229.
255. See supra notes 169, 171 and accompanying text; Mayer, supra note 222, at 2 (noting
elections are an administrative nightmare as they "are typically run on a single day (making it
impossible to make adjustments once problems are identified); involve hundreds of thousands of
one-time, underpaid, and poorly trained poll workers (making it nearly impossible to screen workers
or monitor their performance); are conducted at facilities rarely controlled by election administrators
(intensifying the monitoring problem); and require local officials to make millions of on-the-spot
decisions about whether a particular voter is qualified to cast a ballot").
256. Wassom, supra note 139, at 371-74 (noting the FEC has largely been a failure, deserving of
its nickname the "Failure-to-Enforce Commission").
257. Mayer, supra note 222, at 7. See Pastor,supranote 129, at 274. In 1971, the FEC passed an
Act-the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971-making public funding unavailable "as
candidates and their parties try to influence the votes of the electors, the counting of their ballots at
the joint session of Congress, or any votes of the House and Senate for President or Vice President,
respectively." Josephson & Ross, supra note 25, at 186.
258. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. The passage of HAVA is really the first
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body is relatively weak and lacks the teeth to truly enforce election reform
amongst the states.259
The Constitution presents difficulties when establishing a strong federal
body to oversee presidential elections. 260 Any commission must navigate
through these stormy waters to have legitimate power. Recent jurisprudence
has been favorable towards allowing Congress more control over
presidential electionS261 and the enactment of HAVA is an illustration of this
broad power.262 However, the concurrences and dissents in the most recent
Supreme Court decisions have favored a return of complete oversight and
administration to state legislatures.263 Within this somewhat tenuous
framework, changes to the EAC can-and should-be made.
India and Australia illustrate the need for an independent electoral
commission.26 In both countries, one central body controls every aspect of
electoral administration. 265 The HAVA attempted to create a central
clearinghouse with the EAC.266 However, without real power this
commission cannot serve a vital purpose in election administration. 267 The
EAC is a great starting point, but it needs additional provisions before
American elections near the efficiency and satisfaction of elections in other
democracies.268
First, the EAC should be given the power to decide election disputes.269
Instead of thousands of judges in hundreds of jurisdictions deciding minute
details of the election process, 27 0 federal elections would be more consistent

time America has had a regulatory body oversee federal elections. Pastor, supra note 129, at 274.
259. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. "The Election Assistance Commission is
aspirational, offering guidelines and suggestions; it has no authority to issue binding regulations."
Mayer, supranote 222, at 7.
260. See supra Part II.
261. See supra Part III.
262. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 112-17, 124-26 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 212-18, 235-39 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 215-21, 235-39 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part V.
269. Allowing the EAC to decide disputes also helps keep the process independent of political
influences. Elmendorf, supra note 5, at 431-32 ("[I]n the election law context, where voters ...
may suspect their representatives of improperly elevating partisan advantage or personal security-inoffice above the overall health of the political process, voters may well develop a presumptive
preference for policymaking by a politically insulated body.").
270. "[T]he establishment of an independent electoral commission with a role in law reform
lowers the cost of judicial intervention in the political process." Id. at 440.

1153

if one central body decided election disputes. 27' The EAC official in each
state would be responsible for assembling a team of trained and certified
district election officials to help make these determinations.272 Once election
officials decide a dispute, that decision would be binding in all future cases
decided in the district. The officials would make their decisions based on
the laws set forth in HAVA and other legislation created by the EAC.273
These decisions would apply only during presidential elections.
Second, Congress ought to grant the EAC more remedial power than it
currently has. The EAC has very little power to effectuate real reform, 274
whereas India's commission has broad constitutional power and because of
this mandate is able to properly administer elections and follow up on
problems.275 Both the government and voters view the commission as the
final authority on election disputes.276 For the EAC to be taken seriously, it
must be able to enforce the mandate laid out in HAVA as well as decisions
made in regards to election disputes.
Currently, HAVA is merely a carrot-offering money to those states
that choose to change the type of technology used during presidential
elections.277 If states choose not to comply with voting technology
standards, the EAC has little power to make them comply. 27 8 States would
likely comply with the changes in HAVA if the EAC were allowed to refuse
all federal funding to the states for its elections or limit the number of

271. See id. at 434-40 (outlining the benefits of allowing commissions to adjudicate election
issues); Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and MitigationofElectoralErrors: Theory, Practice,Policy,
18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 350, 376-79 (2007) (advocating for the creation of specialized courts to
handle election disputes rather than having state courts decide "inherently political enterprises").
272. A trained team is absolutely necessary. "For the presidential election in 2000, approximately
100 million people voted in 200,000 polling districts. This required 1.4 million election workers,
most with little training, supervised by 20,000 election administrators." Pastor, supra note 129, at
275.
273. A great way to get a Commission involved in election administration is to authorize the
Commission a reviewing role over election laws that originate from somewhere else (and not with
the Commission itself). Elmendorf, supra note 5, at 430. In addition to upholding HAVA, the EAC
official would also review the proposed laws the state issues and could submit proposals for
modification of those laws if they do not comport with federal guidelines. Id.
274. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 214, 220-21 and accompanying text.
276. This is not to say they are without oversight. Both countries have provided a checks and
balances system that oversees the commissions and the decisions they make. Elmendorf, supra note
5, at 429 (noting that "[t]he Commission may not override parliamentary enactments. . . ."). In
Australia, the Electoral Commission's accountability is "enforced by a convention of ministerial
responsibility, in which the minister responsible for overseeing the AEC is held responsible for its
conduct, and consistent parliamentary oversight by a legislative committee. . . ." Mayer, supra note
222, at 18. Under HAVA, "(tihe EAC ... is accountable to the Congress, the executive branch and
the courts." Pastor, supra note 129, at 275.
277. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 143-44, 153-54 and accompanying text (describing the powers of the
Attorney General to enforce HAVA).
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electors a state could elect in that election cycle. For example, in the 2008
election the Democratic National Committee punished Florida and Michigan
for moving its primary election date to an earlier time slot.279 Even if these
recommendations are adopted, a reformed EAC is patently weaker if the
members of the EAC and state election officials act in a partisan manner.
Third, members of the EAC and state election officials should be less
partisan and more independent. Currently, members of the EAC are chosen
in such a way that two members of the four-member board are from the
Republican Party, and the other two members are from the Democratic
Party. 280 Though the board is bi-partisan,"[t]his structure has not erased
concerns that the commission is behaving in a partisan manner." 28 1 This is
an area where the EAC could fashion itself after the Australia Election
Commission-which is truly independent 282-and have a Chief Electoral
Officer (CELO) and two (or more) Election Commissioners.
The CELO would be a long-term, President-appointed position without
the possibility of reappointment.28 3 In a sense, the position is akin to that of
a Supreme Court Justice, in that once the person is appointed, he or she is
not beholden to a specific president or political party. The CELO would be
able to create electoral standards and would have the time to implement
these standards. If the position was for a shorter term-say, four yearsthen a situation could arise where a Republican president appoints a
Republican and then four years later a Democratic president replaces the
CELO with a Democrat. This type of uncertainty and partisan positioning
undermines the desire to reduce the amount of partisanship currently in the
electoral process. Thus, the position should be for an extended period of
time and without reappointment so as to deter the CELO from campaigning
or seeking political favors. Furthermore, to decrease the possibility that the
President might appoint a partisan official, the CELO would follow similar
279. Democrats Punish Michigan for Early Primary, MSNBC, Dec. 1, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22054151/. Michigan scheduled its primary for January 15, 2007
even though "Democratic Party rules prohibit states other than Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and
South Carolina from holding nominating contests before Feb. 5." Id The DNC stripped Michigan
of all its 156 delegates. Id. Florida scheduled its primary for January 29 and faced a similar penalty.
Id.
280. See Mayer, supra note 222, at 22.
281. Id. at 21 (citing a study in which the draft report found little evidence of widespread voter
fraud, but the final report noted the question of voter fraud was "still open to 'a great deal of
debate' (citing Ian Urbina, Panel Said to Alter Finding on Voter Fraud,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. I1,
2007)).
282. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
283. See Mayer, supra note 222, at 23 (noting the CELO should be "formally unconnected to any
political party, or who has a reputation for fairness and administrative competence").
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legislative confirmation as current presidential cabinet picks, wherein the
President nominates a person who is then confirmed by the Senate. 28
On the other hand, the Election Commissioners, unlike the CELO,
would be appointed for a fixed term with the possibility of reappointment.
In essence, these are junior officers who report directly to the CELO. In the
Indian system, the President appoints the CELO and the two Election
Commissioners. 2 85 However, given the Framers' concern with an overly
powerful Executive,286 the more prudent approach would be to have the two
Houses of Congress each appoint one or two Election Commissioners.
Allowing the President and all the members of the two Houses of Congress
to appoint the members of the EAC will likely result in a less partisan and
more independent board than currently exists.287
With the current system, the EAC does not oversee the presidential
election process. This job is generally left to each state's Secretary of State
and, whether this person is elected or appointed, the process tends to be
partisan.288 "In most states and counties, the official (or officials) who
administer the election process belongs to one of the major political
parties."289 These officials tend to aspire to higher political office and often
make decisions along partisan lines.
284. Stephen Hess, A Checklist for New Presidents, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/usgenglish/2008/December/20081208133137wrybakcuhO.7936365.html
(noting "[p]residents now
make an effort to pick a cabinet that 'looks like America"'). If presidents are concerned with
choosing a diverse-and potentially non-partisan-cabinet, then it is more than possible to have a
non-partisan CELO appointed and confirmed by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
285. See supranote 216.
286. See supra note 50.
287. Center for Democracy & Election Management, Non Partisan Model Legislation,
http://www.american.edu/ia/cdem/usp/npl.cfm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Center for
Democracy].
288. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 123, at 281. The Secretary's office oversees election
administration but the local governments actually administer them. Pastor, supra note 129, at 275.
Local officials are generally appointed by political party officials rather than elected. Id. at 273-74
("Most officials are appointed by mayors, who are themselves elected at the local level; others are
appointed by political party officials; some are civil servants."). One argument in favor of having a
partisan electoral commission is that partisan officials can be more accountable to the voters who
elected them. Mayer, supranote 222, at 20.
289. Mayer, supra note 222, at 7. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
290. "For much of US [sic] history, election officials' posts were viewed as patronage jobs to be
handed out by the party in power. To a great extent, this has not changed." Pastor, supra note 129,
at 275. The National Association of Secretaries of State argues that being elected and openly
partisan is fairer because then opposing parties can monitor the partisan official. Mayer, supra note
222, at 19. They argue non-partisan officials may still be biased but if they are under the guise of
"independent," this label may obscure the fact that they favor one party over another. Id.
Despite this grand argument, examples from recent elections tend to argue otherwise. In 2000,
Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, administered the recount while at the same time she
was intimately involved with the Bush campaign. Id. "The manual recounts were not completed by
[the deadline], and though one provision of the election statute appeared to give the secretary of state
discretion to extend the deadline, Harris refused to do so." Dworkin, supra note 115, at 5. She then
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As an alternative based on the Indian Election Commission, the CELO
and Election Commissioners would appoint an equivalent to the Secretary of
State who would actually-not just in appearance-be a non-partisan,
impartial professional. 29' This appointed official would answer to the EAC
and would be responsible for the administration of laws relating to elections
and election campaigns, 292 originally the responsibility of the Secretary of
State. 293 The EAC should appoint officials that are known non-partisans,

became a representative in the House. Id. at 23. In 2004, Ohio's Secretary of State, Kenneth
Blackwell, "rul[ed] on the validity of voter registration forms, provisional vote procedures, and
polling place challenges, while serving as co-chair of President Bush's Ohio organization." Mayer
supra, note 222, at 19. California's Secretary of State, Kevin Shelley-a Democrat-diverted
"federal funding provided to upgrade California's balloting process, for partisan purposes." Id. In
the 2006 election, provisional ballots were less likely to be counted if the local election official in a
Democratic precinct was Republican and in the Republican precincts they were less likely to be
counted if the official was a Democrat. Id. at 21. "Given the manifest failure of the partisan
administrative model, the benefits of neutral administration and independence 'are so obvious that
one would think that almost anyone could aggress as to its virtues."' Id. at 23.
291. For instance, Australia's Commission members are completely independent because the
government goes to great lengths to ensure their independence. See supra note 237 and
accompanying text. If some feel this proposal encroaches upon State sovereignty, then another idea
would be to give the decision to each state's governor to appoint the Chief Election Officer. Mayer,
supra note 222, at 23. The Officer would serve a long term without reappointment and would need
supermajority legislative confirmation before being appointed. Id. "The result . . . should be a
professional administration, devoted to a fair process rather than favoring a particular outcome." Id.
at 24.
292. NONPARTISAN

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

MODEL LEGISLATION

§

2(c)-(d) (2005),

availableat http://www.american.edu/ia/cdem/pdfs/NonpartisanModelLegislationFull08-09.pdf.
293. The Carter-Baker Commission's Draft Legislation proposes a similar system whereby the
governor of each state appoints a Chief Election Officer for the state. The following are examples of
some of the duties the Officer would have, an excellent example of the kinds of duties an EAC
appointed official could have:
(1) Supervise the conduct of... all ... elections as provided by law;
(2) Develop and implement uniform training programs for all election officials ... ;
(3) Prepare information for voters on voting problems;
(4) Publish and distribute an election calendar, a manual on election procedures, and a
map of all legislative districts;
(5) Convene a state election conference of county and municipal election administrators .
. . to discuss uniform implementation of state and federal election policies;
(6) Prescribe the form [and wording] of all ballots .. .;
(7) Investigate . . . the nonperformance of duties or violations of election laws by election
officers; ...

(9) Administer oaths, issue subpoenas, summon witnesses, compel the production of . . .
evidence, and fix the time and place for hearing any matters relating to the administration
and enforcement of the election laws;
(10) Aggregate, certify and announce results of state and federal elections; ...
(12) Establish standards for voting precincts and polling locations ... and provide forms
and supplies, including but not limited to ballots, poll books, and reports;
(13) Establish uniform, nondiscriminatory statewide standards for distribution of voting
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who have served in the public sector with integrity and credibility and
preferably have a strong organizational background.294 These individuals
would also need to be cooperative because they would be the liaison
between the EAC and the state's Secretary of State.
The EAC appointed officials would serve year-round as election
officials for each state, but during federal presidential elections they would
be available for the EAC and for whatever needs arise in the state during the
specific election time period. 29 5 During the presidential election, these state
officers would also have access to the staff and resources at the county and
city level where much of the U.S.'s presidential election takes place.296
Having an EAC appointed official at the state level to oversee the local
operations would ensure a more uniform election, granting more legitimacy
to the election's results. Appointing non-partisan officers would lend greater
legitimacy to election officials, especially when these officials must make
controversial decisions regarding electoral disputes.
B. Use of the Mixed-System in U.S. PresidentialElections
One change states could make that would greatly alter the political
landscape is the manner in which they appoint electors. States are currently
able to choose the manner in which their electors are chosen and all states
have chosen direct election.
Most states allot all of their electoral votes to
the candidate who receives a majority of the popular vote (winner-take-all
method).29t However, two states allot electoral votes proportionally.2 99
Germany's system was radical at the time it was created because it mixed
the proportional representation system and single-member district voting.oo
The U.S. system could never be exactly like the German system because
the German legislature, the Bundestag, elects the Chancellor.30 ' However, a
modified version of the mixed system could be achieved if states chose the
equipment ...
(17) Develop a budget for the Commission. . .
(19) Maintain accurate and integrated statewide voter registration lists; ...
(21) Certify voting technology;
(22) Ensure compliance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ....
Id § 2(c).
294. See Center for Democracy, supra note 287.
295. This is very similar to the Indian system that has state appointed officers who work full time
overseeing, directing, and controlling elections on the state level. See supra note 218 and
accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
297. GREENE, supra note 3, at 16.
298. Hasen, supra note 8, at 602.
299. Id. (citing Maine and Nebraska as the two states).
300. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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proportional representation method.302
If states were to choose a
proportional system, 30 3 then the state's electorate would vote for a certain
slate of electors (representing a specific candidate) and those electors would
receive a proportion of the state's allotted electoral votes. For example, if
the electorate in California voted sixty percent for the Democratic candidate
and forty percent for the Republican candidate, the Democratic electors
would receive sixty percent of California's fifty-five electoral votes30 and
the Republican electors would receive the other forty percent. Then, the
electors would elect the President from the various candidates based on the
majority rule system whereby the candidate receiving a majority of the
electoral votes-in the U.S. system 270-30' would win the Presidency.
Though this system would not be exactly like the German system, it
would incorporate the revolutionary use of two electoral systems in one
election. By switching to this type of system, elections would have a better
chance of achieving fairness and consistency. 06 In addition, candidates
302. A similar proposal already in action is the National Popular Vote plan. Hasen, supra note 8,
at 603. The tenets of this plan "would have states agree to allocate all of their electors to whoever
was declared the winner of the popular vote for President in the entire United States." Id. The main
problem with relying on the states to change the way electoral votes are acquired is that if states
choose to not participate in the winner-take-all model, its electoral votes count less than those that
have the winner-take-all model. See supra note 62. Legislators in California recently entertained
the idea of switching from a winner-take-all model to the proportional representation models of
Nebraska and Maine. Hasen, supra note 8, at 605. Not surprisingly, the measure was backed by
Republicans and loathed by Democrats. Id. Ultimately the measure failed to collect enough
signatures because of insufficient funds. Id. The initiative has been harshly criticized as an
unconstitutional violation of Article II, Section 1. Id. at 607-08. Opponents of the initiative believe
the state legislature is the only way for states to change the manner in which their electoral votes are
apportioned; meaning, states cannot initiate legislation for the people to vote on. Id. So what does
"Legislature" in the clause-"each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors"-really mean? Hasen believes the issue is undecided, stating, "A strict
textual view suggests that initiated reform is unconstitutional; case law and policy arguments show
the question is more uncertain. Reasonable judges could reach opposite conclusions on the
question." Id. at 629.
303. Congress or the EAC would not be able to mandate how a state chooses electors because
Article II, Section I and subsequent case law have clearly established this as a state's prerogative to
choose the manner of elections. See supra Parts II, III. However, states could, on their own
choosing, enact this type of system. See supra Parts II, III. Given the constitutional limits inherent
in the current electoral system, this proposal is mainly idealistic and could only effectuate real
reform if every state or near-every state chose to adopt the proportional representation system.
304. Michael R. Blood, CaliforniaElectoral-Vote Plan Could Sway 2008 PresidentialRace, N.
COUNTY T.,
Aug.
1, 2007, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/08/01/news/state/13
2_567_31 07.txt.
305. About.com, How Many Electoral Votes Does a Candidate Need to Win?,
http://712educators.about.com/cs/polisciresource/f/votestowin.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
306. See GREENE, supranote 3, at 25-26. Germany was on the forefront of election reform when
they established a mixed system of voting. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. As
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would be forced to campaign in all states rather than focusing on a few key
states and overlooking other states (for example, California-the state with
the greatest number of electors-is virtually invisible to candidates).o7
C. National Standardsfor Election Administration
The HAVA attempted national standards for election administration
when it mandated states adopt new voting machines and voter registration
lists. 308 Currently, the Constitution bestows the power upon states to
determine the manner in which presidential elections are conducted. 3 9 As
seen from the convention and ratification debates, "manner" referred to who
elected the electors and not how they were elected.3"o Over the years states
have handled the how,31' but this is not necessarily a constitutional
mandate.312 Considering HAVA's detailed provisions concerning voting
machines, voter registration lists, and provisional ballots, it seems Congress
could move more into a position of authority on these aspects of election
administration.
One needed change is a uniform national ballot. This means each state
would receive the same ballot so that voters in Florida are not voting on
butterfly ballots313 while voters in California use optical scan and punch card
ballots.3 14 Use of a uniform national ballot would eliminate the
discrepancies experienced between ballots in the 2000 election. If every
state and district were using the same ballot, then user error would be the
main source of voter problems rather than a confusing ballot. Additionally,

previously noted, mixed systems generally combine plurality or majority voting with proportional
representation. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. Currently Maine and Nebraska
have a "mixed-system" in the sense that the people vote appointing electors based on proportional
representation. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. These electors then join together with
other states' electors to form a majority for one candidate over the other candidates. The two
systems combined-one at a state level and one at a national level-form a "mixed-system" of
voting.
307. Schumaker, supra note 6, at 24.
308. See supranote 139-44 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part II.
310. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
311. One could argue somewhat poorly considering the most recent elections. See supra Part IV.
312. Pastor, supra note 129, at 273.
313. See supra note 133-34.
314. California Secretary of State, Voting Systems Approved for Use in California (Oct. 14,
The type of ballot used affected the
2008), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vselection.htm.
readability of votes in the 2000 election. COENEN & LARSON, supra note 7, at 873 ("[A]n unofficial
recount found that 3061 ballots bore some kind of marking that could be interpreted as a vote for
either Bush or Gore ...; 4892 ballots bore no markings for President; 527 ballots bore markings for
more than one presidential candidate; and 1912 . . . bore clean punches in vacant ballot positions,
with 1667 of these just below the numbers corresponding to one of the two major candidates."
(citations omitted)).

1160

[Vol. 37: 1113, 2010]

ImportingDemocracy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

if every district were to use a uniform national ballot, then they would also
be forced to implement the same-or similar-type of voting technology to
support the uniform ballot.3 " Not surprisingly, national standards for voting
technology are one of the main provisions of HAVA.m Thus, a uniform
ballot would reduce errors between districts, create a more standardized
national system, and help fulfill a vital aspect of Congress's most sweeping
legislation regarding election reform.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Within the confines of Article II, Section 1, one can find a certain
amount of breathing room for congressional control over election
administration. The Supreme Court opened the way for Congress when it
articulated the need for a certain amount of control to ensure elections were
free from fraud and irregularities. Following the disastrous 2000 election,
Congress passed bipartisan legislation, asserting itself in a greater way over
presidential elections. Though the HAVA was a bold move on Congress's
part to assert power granted by the Supreme Court, the Act did not go far
enough to ensure free and fair elections. Looking abroad for help, one can
apply the lessons learned from Germany, India, and Australia to create a
better, more efficient American electoral system. A system that creates a
non-partisan electoral commission with real power to oversee elections,
incorporates a proportional representation system with a majority rule
system, and focuses on national standards for ballots and voting technology.
The proposed reforms are merely a stepping-stone in the history of electoral
reform and will hopefully make the U.S. system more consistent across state
lines.
Amanda Kelley Myers*

315. One way to increase participation and ensure national standards is compulsory voting. See
supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the benefits of compulsory voting in
Australia. Currently the United States does not compel its citizens to vote, but one article seeks to
change this by advocating for the use of compulsory voting in America. Notes, The Case for
Compulsory Voting in the United States, 121 HARv. L. REv. 591, 592-93 (2007) [hereinafter Case
for Compulsory Voting]. The article argues "that compulsory voting is a legitimate infringement
upon individual liberty for the purpose of ensuring that political outcomes reflect the preferences of
the electorate." Id.
316. See supranote 146-47 and accompanying text.
* J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 2009. A special thanks must be given to my
incredibly supportive and loving husband, without whom this Comment would not have been
written.
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